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ABSTRACT 
Ways to reduce the impact of worry in generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) have received 
little experimental research attention. Previous research has found that those with GAD are 
vulnerable to negative emotionality immediately following periods of worry; emotion regulation 
strategies could be useful to mitigate reactivity following worry. One promising strategy is 
mindfulness, defined as sustained attention toward the present moment with an attitude of 
curiosity and acceptance. Experimental research has found that mindfulness reduces negative 
affect and improves emotion regulation. This strategy is likely more effective than thought 
suppression, a common strategy used in GAD.  
This online study recruited 300 individuals with analogue GAD who completed several self-
report measures of worry severity, emotion dysregulation, mindfulness, and experiential 
avoidance and underwent experimental inductions of worry (versus no-worry control) and 
regulation strategy (mindfulness versus thought suppression versus no-strategy control) before 
watching a sad film clip and reporting state affect and emotion dysregulation. 
Contrary to hypotheses, the mindfulness manipulation did not have a buffering effect on 
the relation between worry and negative affect or emotion dysregulation. The only predicted 
significant finding indicated that the mindfulness manipulation had a main effect on negative 
affect, with visual trends indicating that this effect was driven by those who did not worry. An 
exploratory analysis indicated that a mindfulness manipulation increased positive affect 
following worry, however. Clinical implications and future directions are discussed. 
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1 INTRODUCTION  
1.1 Overview 
Worry is the cardinal feature of generalized anxiety disorder (GAD). Those with GAD think 
excessively and uncontrollably about future events with possible negative outcomes, to the 
extent that worry becomes disabling (APA, 2013). In fact, those with GAD report more disability 
than those with any other anxiety disorder (Grant et al., 2005). Unfortunately, GAD is also 
difficult to treat, with an average response rate of only 47.0% in a recent meta-analysis (Loerinc 
et al., 2015). Experimental research on worry has shed much light on our theoretical 
understanding of GAD, aiding in treatment development. However, little is known at the 
experimental level about how to change the immediate impact of worry. 
Previous research has found that those with GAD react to emotional stimuli with higher 
negative affect and worse emotion regulation immediately following a worry episode 
(McLaughlin, Mennin, & Farach, 2007). That is, if individuals with GAD worry, and then they 
are exposed to a stimulus evoking negative affect, they do not cope as well with that stimulus. 
Such findings have practical clinical significance, as it is possible that using emotion regulation 
strategies following worry periods could reduce reactivity. This clinical possibility can be 
examined experimentally and is the focus of the present study.  
Specifically, mindfulness may be an effective emotion regulation strategy following 
worry periods, given that experimental research has found that mindfulness aids in the regulation 
of emotion (Arch & Craske, 2006; Feldman, Greeson, & Senville, 2010) and that treatment 
research indicates that mindfulness may be beneficial for those with GAD (Evans et al., 2008). 
Those with GAD often use thought suppression as an emotion regulation strategy (Becker, 
Rinck, Roth, & Margraf, 1998); mindfulness will likely be more effective than thought 
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suppression, which a large body of evidence has suggested is ineffective (e.g., Koster, Rassin, 
Crombez, & Näring, 2003; Wegner, Erber, & Zanakos, 1993).  
My dissertation project is an experimental study which explores the effects of 
mindfulness for those with analogue GAD (i.e., GAD diagnosed with a standardized self-report) 
immediately following worry periods. Specifically, people with analogue GAD underwent an 
experimental procedure through an online portal. Following self-report baseline measures, they 
were randomly assigned to worry for five minutes, or think about a neutral stimulus for five 
minutes (Induction 1). Following this, they were assigned to a five-minute mindfulness 
meditation, a five-minute neutral-thinking condition, or a five-minute thought suppression 
condition (Induction 2). They then viewed a three-minute film clip to induce negative affect (i.e., 
sadness), and completed measures of state emotion dysregulation and negative affect. 
The current manuscript begins with a review of GAD and theories for how GAD is 
caused and maintained. Emotion regulation is then defined, and research on emotion regulation 
in GAD to date is reviewed. I then discuss thought suppression in GAD, and propose 
mindfulness as a potentially effective emotion regulation strategy that is counter to thought 
suppression. Following this review, I discuss the experimental studies which led to the 
hypotheses generated in the present study. I then describe the design of the experiment, provide 
results for each hypothesis, and discuss the implications of my findings. 
1.2 Generalized Anxiety Disorder  
Worry is a primarily verbal-linguistic activity wherein an individual thinks, in an 
uncontrollable way, about uncertain future events with possible future negative outcomes 
(Borkovec & Inz, 1990; Borkovec, Robinson, Pruzinsky, & DePree, 1983). Generalized anxiety 
disorder (GAD) is a psychiatric disorder characterized by excessive, uncontrollable worry (APA, 
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2013). The specific topics of worry for individuals with GAD are similar to the worries of 
healthy controls (Diefenbach, Stanley, & Beck, 2001), such as worries about health, work 
performance, and interpersonal conflicts. Worry is a common experience; most adults experience 
transient periods of worry in a given week (Tallis, Davey, & Capuzzo, 1994). However, 
individuals with GAD worry about more topics than healthy controls, and they report more 
frequent, less controllable, and more distressing worry periods (Hoyer, Becker, & Roth, 2001).  
GAD is a relatively common diagnosis, with a 12-month prevalence rate of 2.1% and a 
lifetime prevalence of 4.1% of the general population in the United States (Grant et al., 2005). 
Although GAD is serious and impairing without comorbidity, the vast majority of people with 
GAD also meet criteria for another psychiatric disorder. Lifetime comorbidity rates are estimated 
at 89.8% (Grant et al., 2005); common comorbid conditions include major depressive disorder 
(MDD), panic disorder, substance use disorders, and dependent personality disorder (Carter, 
Wittchen, Pfister, & Kessler, 2001; Grant et al., 2005). The high rates of comorbidity that are 
typical for GAD have led some researchers to question whether GAD is accurately categorized 
as an independent diagnosis (e.g., T. Brown, Chorpita, & Barlow, 1998). Many of the symptoms 
that are common in GAD, such as irritability, difficulty sleeping, and restlessness, overlap with 
the criteria for other disorders, like MDD and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) (APA, 
2013). Also, GAD and MDD have extremely high genetic correlations in addition to the high 
prevalence of comorbidity across the conditions (Kendler, Gardner, Gatz, & Pedersen, 2007).  
Nevertheless, GAD and MDD differ in their course, with GAD presenting chronically 
while MDD more commonly presents episodically (Fergusson, Horwood, & Boden, 2006). They 
also differ in their environmental risk factors, with low socioeconomic status and childhood 
maltreatment uniquely predicting “pure” adulthood GAD and family history of depression and 
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low positive emotionality in childhood predicting “pure” MDD in a longitudinal study following 
1,037 individuals over 32 years (Moffitt et al., 2007). In addition, GAD is impairing even when 
it occurs without comorbidity (Grant et al., 2005); thus, GAD remains an independent diagnostic 
category to date. 
Unfortunately, GAD has only a 47% response rate to state-of-the-art treatment (Loerinc 
et al., 2015). Even after they receive the treatment with the strongest empirical support to date 
(i.e., cognitive behavioral therapy), most people with GAD do not show “high end-state 
functioning” (Waters & Craske, 2005). One hypothesized explanation for their poor response is 
that the nature of worry, the core feature of GAD, does not easily lend itself to exposure-based 
treatments (Borkovec, 2002). By nature, worry in GAD shifts constantly, as it focuses on 
multiple domains of ever-changing daily life, and the apprehension associated with worry often 
occurs without specific feared outcomes (Butler, 1994) and is thereby difficult to disprove. Thus, 
theoretical models of GAD, and laboratory component studies based on these theories, have 
sought to better explain the cardinal feature of the disorder: worry. 
1.3 Theoretical Perspectives on GAD 
1.3.1 Avoidance theory 
Perhaps the most widely accepted theory of GAD is the avoidance theory of worry, 
developed by Borkovec, Alcaine, and Behar (2004). The avoidance theory posits that worry is a 
covert behavior which allows individuals to cognitively avoid feelings of threat, or perceive that 
they are avoiding real threat. That is, when people worry, they feel less physiological anxiety, 
and they believe they are preventing negative future outcomes (Borkovec et al., 2004). Behaviors 
which serve such avoidance functions have long been known to be maintained by negative 
reinforcement (Iwata, 1987). Worry persists by this mechanism.  
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Although it may be counterintuitive that worry serves avoidance functions, since worry 
itself involves thinking about aversive future outcomes, a growing body of evidence has 
supported the avoidance theory. First, experimental studies have repeatedly found that worry 
successfully reduces short-term autonomic arousal. Worrying prior to giving a speech reduced 
physiological arousal among female undergraduates with public speaking fears (Borkovec & Hu, 
1990), and worrying after watching a film of a gruesome work accident was associated with less 
post-film anxiety than rehearsing imagery of the film (Wells & Papageorgiou, 1995).  This effect 
has been attributed to language processes (Borkovec et al., 2004); worry is primarily verbal and 
is processed through language rather than imagery (Stöber, 1998b). Language-based processing 
is thought to produce less arousal than image-based processing because words take on fewer 
stimulus properties of a feared event than images, which may more vividly represent the fear 
(Borkovec et al., 2004). Verbalizing a feared situation is associated with less short-term 
physiological distress than imagining a scene where the feared event occurs (Vrana, Cuthbert, & 
Lang, 1986). Those with GAD show a predominance of language-based thoughts, rather than 
imagery, compared to healthy controls (Borkovec & Inz, 1990). Also, worry in GAD tends to 
consist of abstract, rather than concrete, language (Goldwin & Behar, 2011; Stöber & Borkovec, 
2002), which is even less likely to evoke physiologically arousing imagery (Marschark & 
Cornoldi, 1991).  
In addition to reducing autonomic arousal, worry may be perceived to reduce the 
likelihood of future catastrophe, thus serving an additional avoidance function. Worriers with 
and without GAD believe that worry is helpful for motivation to engage in goal-directed 
behavior, to prepare for negative future events, and to problem-solve to prevent or reduce the 
impact of negative future outcomes (Borkovec & Roemer, 1995). People with untreated GAD 
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have little evidence to suggest otherwise. When documented through daily monitoring, most of 
the outcomes people with GAD worry about do not actually occur, and they often cope better 
than they expected when these outcomes do occur (Borkovec, Hazlett-Stevens, & Diaz, 1999). 
People with GAD may attribute positive outcomes to their worry because worry is often an 
antecedent to these outcomes (Borkovec et al., 1999). The lack of concreteness of worry in GAD 
may actually prevent effective problem-solving (Stöber, 1998b), but without evidence to the 
contrary, those with GAD may believe that their worry is an effective problem-solving aid.    
Although worry reduces short-term physiological arousal and is perceived to aid in 
problem-solving, in the long term, worry backfires on both counts. In a sample of healthy 
undergraduates, those who worried initially showed the lowest physiological arousal to a feared 
stimulus (i.e., imagining giving a speech to a large audience). However, they failed to habituate 
(i.e., experience less arousal over time exposed to a stimulus) to the stimulus over multiple trials, 
continuing to have heightened self-report anxiety and cardiovascular activation over time 
(Borkovec & Hu, 1990). In comparison, those instructed to engage in relaxed thinking showed 
significantly higher initial anxiety, but then showed reductions in both measures over multiple 
trials. When anxiety throughout all trials was summed and compared across groups, the worry 
group showed higher overall self-report and cardiovascular anxiety due to their failure to 
habituate.  
Worry also backfires in effective problem-solving. Although problem elaboration (i.e., 
verbally describing the details and context of a current problem) can be an adaptive coping 
strategy (D’Zurilla & Goldfried, 1971; Schönpflug, 1989), worry interferes with the concreteness 
or clarity of problem elaborations (Stöber, Tepperwien, & Staak, 2000). Problem-solving 
attempts that lack concreteness prevent individuals from identifying effective strategies for 
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action, thereby preventing the resolution of worry (Stöber, 1998b). Worry and GAD are thought 
to be maintained by these processes. 
1.3.2 Emotion regulation 
Although the avoidance theory accounts for the maintenance of worry over time, some 
have argued that it may not fully account for the emotional experience that might prompt those 
with GAD to use worry as a rigid strategy (Mennin, Heimberg, Turk, & Fresco, 2006). Mennin 
et al. (2006) suggest that difficulties in emotion regulation might account for the excessive use of 
worry that characterizes this population.  
Emotion regulation is defined as “the processes by which individuals influence which 
emotions they have, when they have them, and how they experience and express these emotions” 
(Gross, 1998). Emotion is defined as a brief form of affect, wherein an individual reacts to a 
personally relevant internal or external event with response tendencies which may include 
experiential, behavioral, and/or physiological responses (Rottenberg & Gross, 2007). At times, 
people influence this process, consciously or unconsciously. When their actions are aimed at 
influencing emotions, they are using emotion regulation. Emotion regulation may involve 
changing the situation (situation selection or situation modification), where one places attention 
within the situation (attentional deployment), appraisal of the situation (cognitive change), or 
one’s behavioral response (response modulation; Gross & Thompson, 2007). For example, a 
person might not want to experience, or express, extremely high anxiety during upcoming job 
interviews. In order to regulate the experience or expression of anxiety, he might choose to apply 
for jobs he has already competently performed in the past (situation selection). He might also 
wear his nicest suit to boost his confidence (situation modification) or focus his attention on the 
interviewer rather than his anxiety (attentional deployment). He may remind himself that he is 
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actually an excellent candidate for the position (cognitive change) or try to avoid fidgeting 
(response modulation). Each of these chosen strategies may or may not successfully reduce his 
anxiety or anxious responding, but they are all emotion regulation attempts. 
The processes of attempting to regulate emotion, here defined as emotion regulation, 
should not be equated with adaptive regulation of emotion. Emotion regulation may be adaptive 
in the long term, or not. For example, wearing one’s nicest suit to an interview may aid in the 
regulation of emotion, and, assuming that the suit was the appropriate level of dress for the 
setting, will result in few negative consequences.  However, those who engage in non-suicidal 
self-injury may use this behavior because it successfully reduces the intensity of negative affect 
(Franklin et al., 2010; Nock, 2009), but they experience social and health consequences because 
of their chosen strategy. Similarly, those with GAD use an immediately effective emotion 
regulation strategy, worry, which is an ineffective long-term regulatory strategy (Borkovec & 
Hu, 1990). That is, those who use emotion regulation may still experience difficulties in the 
process of emotion regulation, by failing to execute strategies in a way that successfully 
modulates emotion or increases goal-directed, adaptive behavior. 
Gross’ model of emotion regulation was developed for the purpose of conceptual clarity 
in the time-course of emotion regulation for experimental analysis (Gross, 2002); broad 
difficulties with the effective utilization of emotion regulation strategies have been captured in 
other definitions. Theories on difficulties with emotion regulation were integrated by Gratz and 
Roemer (2004) in order to develop a self-report measure that captured an individual’s overall 
tendency toward emotion dysregulation. The conceptualizations they integrate suggest that:  
1) emotions are functional and may not need modification for regulation (Cole, Michel, 
& Teti, 1994);  
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2) understanding and accepting emotion is part of regulation (Linehan, 1993);  
3) monitoring and evaluating emotional experience may be as important in regulation as 
modifying the experience of emotion (Thompson & Calkins, 1996);  
4) emotional suppression and excessive control are maladaptive and dysregulating 
(Hayes, Wilson, Gifford, Follette, & Strosahl, 1996);  
5) reacting to one’s own emotion with negative affect is maladaptive (Cole et al., 1994; 
Paivio & Greenberg, 1998);  
6) modulation, rather than elimination, of emotion, for the purpose of goal-directed 
behavior, may characterize effective emotion regulation (Linehan, 1993; Melnick & 
Hinshaw, 2000); and  
7) emotion regulation is characterized by the effective and flexible use of strategies in the 
face of emotional experience (Cole et al., 1994; Thompson, 1994).  
These existing conceptualizations expand the work of Gross and colleagues by adding the 
characterization of effective emotion regulation versus emotion dysregulation to Gross’ time-
process model of how this regulation occurs over time. 
Integrating these conceptualizations, Gratz and Roemer (2004) define difficulties in 
emotion regulation, or emotion dysregulation, as the presence of problems across the following 
dimensions: acceptance of emotional experiences, completion of goal-directed behaviors in the 
face of emotion, inhibition of impulses, awareness of emotion, access to adaptive regulatory 
strategies, and clarity of emotional experience. In terms of Gross’ process model of emotion 
regulation, emotion dysregulation is characterized by difficulty in choosing and appropriately 
utilizing effective emotion regulation strategies across the time-stages of the model. Gratz and 
Roemer’s (2004) conceptualization of difficulties in emotion regulation has shed light of the 
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influence of emotion dysregulation on psychopathology. Emotion dysregulation has been 
implicated across a wide range of psychopathology, such as eating disorders (Treasure, Corfield, 
& Cardi, 2012), post-traumatic stress disorder (Boden et al., 2013), and alcohol dependence 
(Sher & Grekin, 2007). Increasing evidence has also suggested that emotion dysregulation 
characterizes GAD (Mennin, Heimberg, Turk, & Fresco, 2005). 
Those with GAD may use worry because they have difficulties in understanding emotion, 
tolerating emotion, and choosing effective behavior while feeling intense emotion. That is, they 
have difficulties in emotion regulation. Mennin, Heimberg, Turk, and Fresco (2005) have argued 
that an emotion dysregulation model accounts for the development and maintenance of GAD. In 
a series of preliminary studies supporting this model, they found that those with GAD experience 
more intense emotions, are more reactive to their emotional experiences, have poorer 
understanding of their emotions, and have reduced ability to self-soothe in comparison to 
controls (Mennin et al., 2005). A composite emotion regulation score using these variables 
successfully classified 72.3% of individuals with GAD. Associations between GAD symptoms 
and emotion dysregulation have been replicated in many subsequent research studies, in healthy 
samples, analogue GAD samples, and samples of individuals with diagnosed GAD (e.g., Roemer 
et al., 2009; Salters-Pedneault, Roemer, Tull, Rucker, & Mennin, 2006; Turk, Heimberg, 
Luterek, Mennin, & Fresco, 2005).  In addition, worry behavior may maintain emotion 
dysregulation in GAD. Participants with GAD who worried before being exposed to a sad film 
clip showed greater sadness and more emotion dysregulation in response to the clip than those 
with GAD who had not worried (McLaughlin et al., 2007). That is, for those with GAD, 
worrying immediately before exposure to an emotionally evocative stimulus increased the 
intensity of sadness and decreased their ability to respond effectively to sadness.  
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The evidence to date thus suggests that emotion dysregulation plays a role in the 
maintenance of GAD symptoms. Multiple aspects of emotion dysregulation  have been linked to 
GAD symptoms and chronic worry over and above variance explained by negative affect 
(Salters-Pedneault et al., 2006), suggesting that emotion dysregulation in GAD is not simply the 
result of higher negative affect in this population. When accounting for overlap across social 
anxiety disorder, major depression, and MDD, heightened intensity of emotion and maladaptive 
management of emotion are uniquely associated with symptoms of GAD (Mennin, Holaway, 
Fresco, Moore, & Heimberg, 2007). GAD is specifically associated with emotion regulation 
deficits and the use of worry to downregulate the experience of anxiety. Thus, research that 
examines effective use of emotion regulation strategies in GAD is warranted. 
1.4 The Role of Thought Suppression 
One common, but ineffective, emotion regulation strategy for those with GAD is thought 
suppression (Borkovec & Lyonfields, 1993; de Bruin, Muris, & Rassin, 2007). Thought 
suppression can be defined as the attempt not to think certain thoughts, through active avoidance 
or elimination attempts (Wegner, Schneider, Carter, & White, 1987). More than inattention or 
inadvertent distraction, thought suppression requires that an individual both intend to suppress a 
thought and carry out their plan by suppressing cognition relevant to the original thought 
(Wegner et al., 1987). Thought suppression is considered a cognitive emotion regulation strategy 
– an attempt to alter the form, intensity, or frequency of an emotion through eliminating thoughts 
with emotional charge (Aldao & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2010).  
Wegner and colleagues, the creators of the classic “white bear” experiments, have 
repeatedly demonstrated that thought suppression is ineffective in reducing or eliminating 
thoughts (e.g., Wegner & Erber, 1992; Wegner et al., 1987; Wegner, Shortt, Blake, & Page, 
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1990). Rather than decreasing the target thoughts as intended, thought suppression leads to a 
paradoxical increase in those thoughts (Wegner et al., 1987), as well as an increase in associated 
physiological arousal (Wegner et al., 1990). Overall, the suppression literature has found that 
suppression leads to an immediate increase in target thoughts during suppression, increased 
occurrence of target thoughts after suppression, and higher rates of intrusive thoughts during 
attempts to suppress thoughts or mood while under cognitive demand (see Wenzlaff & Wegner, 
2000). Thus, although individuals use suppression as an emotion regulation strategy, attempting 
to reduce the frequency of an unwanted thought, suppression is not effective toward this end.  
Suppression is currently considered a potential causal and maintenance factor in multiple 
forms of psychopathology (Magee, Harden, & Teachman, 2012; Purdon, 1999). In a sample of 
individuals with anxiety and mood disorders, including GAD, those instructed to suppress 
emotion had higher heart rate in reaction to a film clip which was designed to induce negative 
affect, and higher negative affect during a recovery period than those instructed to accept their 
emotions (Campbell-Sills, Barlow, Brown, & Hofmann, 2006). These experimental effects may 
persist for those who often use thought suppression as an emotion regulation strategy. Similarly, 
chronic thought suppression correlates with symptoms of depression, obsessional thinking, and 
anxiety (Wegner & Zanakos, 1994). 
Thought suppression is common in GAD. Thought suppression is a unique predictor of 
GAD symptoms, over and above other meta-cognition (de Bruin et al., 2007),  and those with 
GAD can be discriminated from controls by their high scores on a measure of thought 
suppression (Dugas, Gagnon, Ladouceur, & Freeston, 1998). Worry, the core feature of GAD, 
has been considered a thought suppression technique in itself (Borkovec & Lyonfields, 1993). 
Individuals with GAD, but not healthy controls, report that they often use worry to distract 
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themselves from other thoughts, indicating ongoing attempts to suppress cognition (Borkovec & 
Roemer, 1995).   
Understanding why thought suppression is problematic may shed light on alternative 
emotion regulation strategies, which might be more effective. One possibility is that chronic 
suppression of emotionally charged thoughts might prevent habituation to emotionally evocative 
stimuli, increasing sensitivity to anxious and depressive thoughts and symptoms (Wegner & 
Zanakos, 1994; Wenzlaff & Wegner, 2000). Additionally, unwanted thoughts may become even 
more distressing when we are attempting to control them (Wegner et al., 1993).  
While using effortful control to attempt to alter cognition, individuals often cognitively 
search for failures in this effortful control, thus priming thoughts which run contrary to control 
efforts for an “alarm” signal (see Lombardi, Higgins, & Bargh, 1987; Martin, 1990). 
Experiencing alarm and negative reactions to unwanted cognition and emotion is an important 
facet of emotion dysregulation (Gratz & Roemer, 2004). This may have particular relevance for 
those with GAD; they chronically use worry as a thought suppression technique (Borkovec & 
Lyonfields, 1993), but experience heightened emotion dysregulation after worry periods 
(McLaughlin et al., 2007). Emotion regulation strategies that allow individuals to habituate to 
unwanted thoughts, reducing this reactivity, might be more effective than thought suppression. 
Because habituation occurs through exposure, strategies that encourage attention and awareness 
of negative thoughts and feelings, while reducing control efforts, might be particularly fruitful. 
1.5 Mindfulness 
Mindful awareness may be an alternative to suppression and an avenue to combat the 
experiential avoidance and emotion dysregulation tendencies that characterize GAD. Although 
mindfulness has received a variety of definitions in the literature, the present study defines 
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mindfulness as attention and awareness directed toward the present moment, with an attitude of 
curiosity and acceptance toward the experience of the present (Bishop et al., 2006). Rather than 
attempting to alter the form, intensity, or frequency of negative thoughts and feelings, 
mindfulness encourages people to allow thoughts and feelings to rise and fall naturally – the 
opposite of suppression. This approach toward thoughts and emotions appears to have many 
benefits. Trait mindfulness, or a tendency to be mindful across situations and contexts, has been 
positively associated with a wide variety of markers of psychological health. These include, but 
not limited to, higher self-esteem, optimism, sense of autonomy, and life satisfaction (K. W. 
Brown & Ryan, 2003). Trait mindfulness is also found to be negatively associated with various 
forms of psychopathology, including symptoms of PTSD, depression, social anxiety, and 
substance abuse, among others (K. W. Brown & Ryan, 2003; Garland, Boettiger, Gaylord, 
Chanon, & Howard, 2012; Smith et al., 2011).  
Mindfulness is, by nature, antithetical to the avoidance of internal experiences that 
characterizes GAD. People with GAD avoid their present-moment experiences, and they tend to 
judge, fear, and attempt to control their negative emotional reactions (Mennin et al., 2005; Wells, 
2004).  Mindfulness practice encourages individuals to experience the present moment, even if it 
is unpleasant, without judgment and without attempts to avoid the experience (Bishop et al., 
2006). By encouraging nonjudgmental present-moment awareness, mindfulness meditation 
successfully reduces experiential avoidance over time (Sachse, Keville, & Feigenbaum, 2011). 
Because mindfulness reduces experiential avoidance, and GAD is thought to be maintained by 
avoidance processes (Borkovec et al., 2004), researchers have begun to examine mindfulness in 
this population. They have found that self-reported mindfulness uniquely predicts GAD 
symptom severity over and above broad anxiety and depressive symptoms (Roemer et al., 2009) 
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and that mindfulness-based treatments may be effective in reducing symptoms in GAD (Evans et 
al., 2008). 
Perhaps, in part, through reducing avoidance, mindfulness may be an effective and 
adaptive emotion regulation strategy (A. M. Hayes & Feldman, 2004). Mindfulness is associated 
with adaptive problem-solving, including analysis of problems and rehearsal of plans to resolve 
the problem, and is not associated with maladaptive strategies, such as deliberation without 
effective action and fantasizing about desired outcomes (Feldman & Hayes, 2005). Increases in 
mindfulness over the course of psychological treatment are also associated with reductions in 
avoidance and rumination, both of which are maladaptive emotion regulation strategies (Kumar, 
Feldman, & Hayes, 2008). These and other findings have been taken to indicate that mindfulness 
aids in “decentering,” or reducing the tendency to overly avoid or overly engage with 
emotionally relevant material, thus allowing for more adaptive emotion regulation (A. M. Hayes 
& Feldman, 2004).  
1.6 Experimental Findings 
Theories of GAD and the evidence to date suggest that GAD may be caused and 
maintained by avoidance of internal experiences and emotion dysregulation (Borkovec et al., 
2004; Mennin et al., 2005). These models of GAD have been supported by laboratory component 
research demonstrating that worry operates by avoidance mechanisms, physiologically and 
cognitively (Borkovec & Hu, 1990; Wells & Papageorgiou, 1995), and that worry has emotion 
dysregulatory properties (McLaughlin et al., 2007; Mennin et al., 2005). Although laboratory-
based experimental research has helped us to understand how GAD might be caused and 
maintained, it has focused less on the treatment of these underlying mechanisms to inform the 
treatment of this specific condition. Such questions are, instead, often answered through 
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mediational analyses of clinical trials (Kazdin, 2007). However, laboratory component studies 
may also be particularly useful in evaluating the impact of hypothesized treatment mechanisms 
(David & Montgomery, 2011). Such research allows for careful control and manipulation of 
possible confounding variables in a way that is difficult to achieve in clinical trials (Hayes, 
Levin, Plumb-Vilardaga, Villatte, & Pistorello, 2013).  
McLaughlin et al. (2007) examined the effects of worry on emotion generation and 
dysregulation in a sample of 49 individuals with clinically diagnosed GAD and 44 healthy 
controls recruited from an introductory psychology college course. All participants completed a 
battery of questionnaires before being assigned to worry, relaxation, or control conditions. Those 
in the worry condition wrote down three topics they worried most about and were then asked to 
worry about these topics for five minutes. Those in relaxation wrote down three of the most 
pleasant events in their lives and were instructed to relax while thinking of these things. Finally, 
those in the neutral condition were asked to think about what they did over the past weekend. 
Subsequently, participants watched a sad film clip (i.e., sadness mood induction), and then 
completed measures of current emotion intensity and emotion dysregulation. Results revealed 
that those with GAD who worried showed greater negative affect than those with GAD in the 
other conditions (i.e., relaxation and neutral thinking). In addition, those with GAD who were 
assigned to worry showed increased emotion dysregulation (as measured with a state version of 
the Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale) following the film clip compared to controls 
assigned to worry. This research indicates that those with GAD are vulnerable to negative affect 
following worry periods, and they are less able to use effective regulation strategies in the face of 
this emotion.  
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When people with GAD are vulnerable to negative emotion, they may be tempted to use 
a familiar regulation strategy (de Bruin et al., 2007): thought suppression. This strategy is 
unlikely to be effective. A recent meta-analysis of experimental research on emotion regulation 
strategies found that suppression of thoughts relevant to a negative emotion led to the opposite of 
desired emotional outcomes (Webb, Miles, & Sheeran, 2012). For example, Koster, Rassin, 
Crombez, and Näring (2003) found that undergraduates assigned to suppress thoughts about an 
upcoming painful stimulus reported lower frequency and duration of threat-related thoughts than 
those assigned to a control condition while they were suppressing thoughts. However, following 
suppression, they reported higher frequency and duration of these thoughts as well as higher self-
report anxiety than controls. In another study, undergraduates were assigned either to suppress or 
not to suppress positive, unwanted, or neutral thoughts (Purdon & Clark, 2001). Suppressing 
unwanted thoughts was associated with greater discomfort and worse mood than suppression of 
other thoughts and the non-suppression control conditions.  
Conversely, experimental research on mindfulness meditation suggests that it is an 
effective emotion regulation strategy, unlike thought suppression. Healthy adults guided through 
a mindfulness meditation involving focused breathing showed lower negative affect, lower 
emotional volatility, and greater willingness to view negative slides than those who were 
instructed to worry and those who were instructed in unfocused attention (Arch & Craske, 2006).  
Individuals randomly assigned to a mindful breathing meditation, more than other forms of 
relaxation (i.e., progressive muscle relaxation and loving kindness meditation) showed weaker 
associations between frequency of negative thoughts and negative reactions to these thoughts 
(Feldman et al., 2010). This suggests that mindful breathing reduces reactivity to distress.  
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Mindfulness meditation has also consistently increased heart rate variability in 
experimental research (e.g., Ditto, Eclache, & Goldman, 2006; Krygier et al., 2013; Wu & Lo, 
2008); heart rate variability is considered a physiological index of emotion regulation, with 
greater variability indicative of more effective regulation (Appelhans & Luecken, 2006). Last, 
Erisman and Roemer (2011) examined the effects of induced mindfulness versus control on 
emotion reactivity to film clips in a sample of 30 individuals with elevated scores on a measure 
of emotion dysregulation. Those assigned to mindfulness reported significantly more positive 
affect in response to a positive film clip, and they reported significantly lower negative affect and 
marginally significant increased adaptive regulation compared to controls in response to an 
affectively mixed film clip. Although Erisman and Roemer (2011) found no differences across 
groups in response to a distressing film clip, the authors discuss that the film clip, which depicted 
combat violence, may have been too emotionally evocative to detect effects of mindfulness. 
Overall, the experimental research suggests that worry has emotion dysregulating effects 
among those with GAD, and that different regulation strategies have different effects on one’s 
ability to cope with distressing stimuli. Individuals with GAD often utilize thought suppression, 
a strategy that has been shown to have dysregulating effects in experimental research. It is 
possible that mindfulness may be taught as an alternative regulation strategy for those with 
GAD. The use of this strategy may be clinically useful at times that those with GAD are more 
vulnerable to distress, immediately following worry periods. The present study aims to examine 
this clinical possibility in an experimental design. 
1.7 Summary of the Evidence Supporting the Present Study 
Generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) was previously named the “confusing stepchild 
among the anxiety disorders” (Barlow & Wincze, 1998, p. 23). Treatments based on the best-
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supported theories of GAD have yielded only 50% response rates in terms of high end-state 
functioning (Waters & Craske, 2005), results which are inconsistent with treatment response 
among other anxiety disorders (T. Brown, Barlow, & Liebowitz, 1994). Newer, promising 
theories of GAD suggest that emotion regulation is in need of further study in this population 
(Mennin et al., 2006). 
Those with GAD experience a broad array of emotion regulation difficulties, more than 
those with other anxiety disorders (Turk et al., 2005), to the extent that an emotion regulation 
model might account for the symptoms of GAD (Mennin et al., 2005). The primary symptom of 
GAD, worry, itself increases emotion dysregulation. In a laboratory component study, those with 
GAD who worried prior to being exposed to a sad film clip showed more negative affect and 
more emotion dysregulation than those who did not worry (McLaughlin et al., 2007).  
The effect of worry on negative affect and emotion dysregulation provides an opportunity 
to examine the role of mindfulness as an emotion regulation strategy among those with analogue 
GAD. Because mindfulness is found to aid in “decentering” from emotionally relevant material, 
preventing both avoidance and over-engagement with emotion (A. M. Hayes & Feldman, 2004), 
mindfulness should reduce negative affect and emotion dysregulation in response to emotionally 
evocative material. Relevant to the present study, it may be that mindfulness reduces the effect of 
worry on emotional reactivity and emotion dysregulation when people with GAD are exposed to 
such a stimulus.  
In other laboratory studies, mindfulness meditation has reduced emotion dysregulation 
both by self-report (e.g., Arch & Craske, 2006) and physiological measures (e.g., Ditto et al., 
2006). However, the effects of mindfulness on emotion dysregulation have not yet been observed 
among those with analogue GAD in an experimental study. The evidence to date on the effects of 
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mindfulness suggests that it should aid in emotion regulation. In contrast, a regulation strategy of 
choice for those with GAD, thought suppression (Dugas et al., 1998), should have the opposite 
effect, given the paradoxical effects of thought suppression on cognition (Wegner & Erber, 
1992) and emotion (Campbell-Sills et al., 2006).  
1.8 Objectives 
Using an online-based experimental method, the present study examined the interaction 
between worry and regulation strategy in a sample of individuals with analogue GAD.  
Specifically, the study examined whether mindfulness reduces the impact of worry on negative 
affect and emotion dysregulation in response to an emotionally evocative film, and whether 
thought suppression increases the impact of worry on negative affect and emotion dysregulation.  
Methodologically, I first ran a pilot study and examined whether a mindfulness 
manipulation successfully manipulated the process of mindfulness in the context of an online 
study. Then, I examined the effects of regulation strategy on negative affect and emotion 
dysregulation, specifically examining whether a brief mindfulness manipulation decreases, and 
thought suppression increases, negative affect and emotion dysregulation, in comparison to a 
neutral-thinking control condition. Finally, I examined the interaction between the induction of 
worry and regulation strategy, examining whether the effect of worry on negative affect and 
emotion dysregulation is moderated by regulation strategy. 
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1.9 Hypotheses 
1.9.1 Hypothesis 1 
There would be a main effect of worry; those assigned to the worry group would report 
higher negative affect and higher emotion dysregulation in response to the film than a no-worry 
control group. 
1.9.2 Hypothesis 2 
There would be a main effect of regulation strategy. Those assigned to the mindfulness group 
would report lower negative affect and lower emotion dysregulation in response to the film than 
both a thought suppression group and a no-strategy control group. The thought suppression 
group would show the highest negative affect and emotion dysregulation among the three 
groups. 
1.9.3 Hypothesis 3 
There would be an interaction between worry and regulation strategy. The worry group 
was predicted to have higher negative affect and emotion dysregulation than the no-worry 
control group only for no-strategy control and thought suppression conditions, and not for the 
mindfulness condition. That is, it was predicted that the mindfulness manipulation would reduce 
the impact of worry on negative affect and emotion dysregulation, allowing those who worry to 
resemble those who did not worry before mindfulness. 
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2     METHOD 
2.1 Participants 
2.1.1 Recruitment 
Potential participants for the pilot trial and those for the final experiment were recruited 
from the Amazon Mechanical Turk service, located at http://www.mturk.com. Mechanical Turk 
(MTurk) is a website, which allows users to complete various tasks, called Human Intelligence 
Tasks (HITs), for pay. Requesters can post HITs involving virtually any computer-based task, 
such as surveys, writing, keyword tagging, and audio transcription; workers are paid at the 
successful completion of each task. MTurk workers tend to be paid very little for their work 
(e.g., 5 to 10 cents for a 10-minute task), but preliminary analyses of worker motivation indicate 
that although most workers are motivated by pay, US workers complete the tasks primarily 
because they enjoy them (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011).  
MTurk workers produce high-quality data. Whether workers are asked to complete audio 
transcriptions (Marge, Banerjee, & Rudnicky, 2010), to rate the similarity of musical pieces 
(Urbano & Morato, 2010), or to complete language processing tasks (Snow, O’Connor, Jurafsky, 
& Ng, 2008), MTurk workers perform similarly to experts in completing computer-based tasks; 
high agreement between MTurk workers and experts was achieved in each of these studies.  
Internal consistencies and test-retest stability for surveys hosted on MTurk closely resemble 
those of traditional samples (Buhrmester et al., 2011). Experimental behavioral research using 
MTurk samples yields equivalent results to those gleaned from laboratory-based experiments 
(Horton, Rand, & Zeckhauser, 2011; S. Wang, Huang, Yao, & Chan, 2015). In addition, the low 
pay typically provided to MTurk workers does not reduce data quality (Buhrmester et al., 2011).  
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The present survey was be listed on Mechanical Turk using the following bylines: 1) 
Pilot trial - “Participate in a study on ways of thinking and how they affect emotion” or 2) Final 
experiment: “Do you worry a lot? Participate in a study for chronic worriers.” Those who accept 
the HIT were first screened for inclusion and exclusion criteria; those who met criteria were 
enrolled in the study. 
2.1.2 Inclusion and exclusion criteria 
All participants met all inclusion and no exclusion criteria. Inclusion criteria for the pilot 
trial included 1) ages 18 through 65, and 2) English-speaking. Exclusion criteria included 1) an 
IP address outside of the United States of America (non-US IP addresses did not see the survey 
listed) and 2) unwillingness to engage in the procedures of the study, which were described in 
the consent process. Inclusion criteria for the final experiment included 1) ages 18 through 65, 2) 
English-speaking, and 3) receiving a score above the clinical cutoff of 5.7 on the GAD-Q-IV. 
Exclusion criteria included 1) an IP address outside of the United States of America (non-US IP 
addresses did not see the survey listed) and 2) unwillingness to engage in the procedures of the 
study, which were described in the consent process. 
2.2 Measures 
Participants in the pilot trial and the final experiment completed the following measures 
in addition to a demographic questionnaire, which was administered at the end of all study 
procedures (see Appendix A to view a copy of all study measures). Demographic information 
collected included age, gender, race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, and history of mindfulness 
practice. See Results section for descriptive statistics of participant demographic characteristics. 
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2.2.1 Generalized Anxiety Disorder Questionnaire-IV (GAD-Q-IV) 
The GAD-Q-IV (Newman et al., 2002) is a 9-item screening measure assessing the 
presence of Generalized Anxiety Disorder. Analogue GAD may be identified using this measure. 
Items vary in their format. Some items are rated dichotomously (e.g., “Do you experience 
excessive worry?”), whereas other items are symptom counts (e.g., “Please place a check next to 
each symptom you have had more days than not”). Yet another set of items in the scale are 
Likert-based (e.g., “How much do worry and physical symptoms interfere with your life, work, 
social activities, family, etc?”), which are rated on an 8-point scale. A total score of 5.7 on the 
GAD-Q-IV correctly classified 88% of individuals with GAD diagnosed by clinical interview, 
with a sensitivity of 83% and specificity of  89% in an ROC analysis (Newman et al., 2002). The 
GAD-Q-IV correlated more strongly with a measure of worry than with measures of post-
traumatic stress symptoms, panic disorder symptoms, depression, and social anxiety, 
demonstrating convergent and discriminant validity. The GAD-Q-IV also showed good test-
retest stability, with 92% of cases classified remaining in their classification group (i.e., GAD 
versus no GAD) after a two-week waiting period, and with a Kappa agreement of 0.64 (Newman 
et al., 2002).  
2.2.2 Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ).  
The PSWQ (Meyer, Miller, Metzger, & Borkovec, 1990) is a 16-item, uni-factorial self-
report measure of pathological worry. The PSWQ was initially derived from a factor analysis of 
161 items related to worry; one factor arose with items that specifically reflected the frequency 
and intensity of worry and was chosen for the PSWQ (Molina & Borkovec, 1994).  Each item is 
rated on a Likert scale from 1 (“Not at all typical”) to 5 (“Very typical”), with five reverse-
scored items; scores range from 16 to 80. The PSWQ has high internal consistency in clinical 
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and non-clinical populations, with alpha coefficients ranging from 0.88 to 0.95 (Borkovec, 1994; 
G. C. Davey, 1993; Molina & Borkovec, 1994; Stöber, 1998a; van Rijsoort, Emmelkamp, & 
Vervaeke, 1999). It also demonstrated good test-retest stability over 2-week and 10-week 
intervals (r = 0.74-0.92) (Meyer et al., 1990; Molina & Borkovec, 1994; Stöber, 1998a). The 
PSWQ successfully distinguishes GAD patients from those with social anxiety disorder (Fresco, 
Mennin, Heimberg, & Turk, 2003) and non-anxious controls (Behar, Alcaine, Zuellig, & 
Borkovec, 2003). In the present study, the PSWQ showed acceptable internal consistency in the 
pilot sample (α = 0.76) and good internal consistency in the final experiment sample (α = 0.89).  
2.2.3 Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale (DERS)  
The DERS (Gratz & Roemer, 2004) is a 36-item self-report measure of tendencies toward 
emotion dysregulation across multiple dimensions. This measure was developed specifically to 
assess difficulties with emotion regulation when distressed; thus, most items begin with “When 
I’m upset” before referring to an aspect of emotion dysregulation. Participants are asked to rate 
each item for how often it applies to them in general; items are rated from 1 (“almost never – 0-
10%”) to 5 (“almost always – 91-100%”). The six subscales of the DERS are as follows: 1) 
Nonacceptance (i.e., nonacceptance of emotional responses), 2) Goals (i.e., difficulties engaging 
in goal-directed behavior), 3) Impulse (i.e., impulse control difficulties), 4) Awareness (i.e., lack 
of emotional awareness), 5) Strategies (i.e., limited access to emotion regulation strategies), and 
6) Clarity (i.e., lack of emotional clarity). Internal consistencies for all six subscales are good, 
ranging from α = 0.80 to 0.89, and the total scale internal consistency is excellent (α = 0.93) 
(Gratz & Roemer, 2004).  
The subscales and total score of the DERS correlate as expected with another 
psychometrically sound measure of emotion (i.e., the Generalized Expectancy for Negative 
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Mood Regulation; Catanzaro & Mearns, 1990) and with deliberate self-harm and abuse 
perpetration behaviors (Gratz & Roemer, 2004). In the present study, the original DERS was 
administered before the two inductions, among other self-report measures, to assess dispositional 
emotion dysregulation. The DERS showed excellent internal consistency in both the pilot (α = 
0.92) and final experiment samples (α = 0.95) of the present study.  
2.2.4 State Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale (S-DERS).  
The S-DERS (Lavender, Tull, Dilillo, Messman-moore, & Gratz, 2015) is a 21-item self-
report measure of current experience of emotion dysregulation, with subscales of 1) 
Nonacceptance – lack of acceptance of current emotions, 2) Modulate – difficulty modulating 
current emotion and behavioral response, 3) Awareness – lack of awareness of current emotion, 
and 4) Clarity – lack of clarity regarding current emotions. The S-DERS has been validated in a 
laboratory setting following a stress induction; it correlated with a scale of emotional reactivity 
following the induction of a stressful stimulus, after controlling for trait emotion dysregulation 
(Lavender et al., 2015). It correlates positively with affect intensity, trait emotion dysregulation, 
and substance abuse, and the total scale has shown good internal consistency (α = 0.86) 
(Lavender et al., 2015). In the present study, the S-DERS showed excellent internal consistency 
in the pilot sample (α = 0.94) and acceptable internal consistency in the final experiment sample 
(α = 0.71).  
2.2.5 Five Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire (FFMQ)  
The FFMQ (Baer, Smith, Hopkins, Krietemeyer, & Toney, 2006) is a 39-item self-report 
measure of five different aspects of mindfulness, including 1) observing, 2) describing, 3) acting 
with awareness, 4) nonjudging of internal experience, and 5) nonreactivity to internal experience. 
This measure was developed from a factor analysis of the items from widely-used mindfulness 
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measures. These measures were the Mindful Attention Awareness Scale (MAAS; Brown & 
Ryan, 2003), the Freiberg Mindfulness Questionnaire (FMI; Walach, Buchheld, Buttenmüller, 
Kleinknecht, & Schmidt, 2006), the Kentucky Inventory of Mindfulness Skills (KIMS; Baer, 
Smith, & Allen, 2004), the Cognitive and Affective Mindfulness Scale (CAMS; Feldman, Hayes, 
Kumar, Greeson, & Laurenceau, 2006), and the Mindfulness Questionnaire (later renamed the 
Southampton Mindfulness Questionnaire; Chadwick et al., 2008).  
Exploratory factor analyses revealed a five-factor solution for these items, which became 
the five subscales of the FFMQ. Each of the 39 items of the FFMQ is rated on a 5-point Likert 
scale from 1 (never or very rarely true) to 5 (very often or always true); items are summed to 
create five subscale scores and a total score of overall mindfulness. The FFMQ shows good 
internal consistency, with acceptable to excellent internal consistencies reported for the subscales 
(α = .75-.91; Baer et al., 2006). The FFMQ scales correlate as expected with a number of 
personality and mental health variables, including neuroticism, difficulties in emotion regulation, 
dissociation, and self-compassion, among others (Baer et al., 2006). Those with meditation 
experience tend to have higher scores across the five subscales than non-meditators (Baer et al., 
2008), and FFMQ scores increase following mindfulness-based treatment (Carmody, Baer, L B 
Lykins, & Olendzki, 2009). In the present study, the FFMQ showed good internal consistency in 
the pilot sample (α = 0.83) and excellent internal consistency in the final experiment sample (α = 
0.92).  
2.2.6 Acceptance and Action Questionnaire – II (AAQ-II) 
The AAQ-II (Bond, Hayes, & Baer, 2011) is a seven-item, unifactorial measure of 
experiential avoidance. Each item is rated on a Likert scale from 1 (never true) to 7 (always 
true), with higher scores indicating greater avoidance. The AAQ-II has shown good 
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psychometric properties, such as good test-retest reliability (3-month reliability: r = 0.81; 12-
month reliability: r = 0.79), adequate to good internal consistency (α = 0.78 to 0.88), and high 
correlations with the original version of the AAQ (r = 0.97; Bond et al., 2011). Convergent 
validity for the AAQ-II has also been established through strong correlations with the White 
Bear Suppression Inventory, another measure of avoidance, in multiple samples. In addition, as 
expected, the AAQ-II correlates with a wide array of measures of psychopathology, such as the 
Beck Depression Inventory and the Symptom Checklist – 90. Divergent validity is evidenced by 
low associations between the AAQ-II and demographic variables and no association between the 
AAQ-II and a measure of social desirability (Bond et al., 2011). In the present study, the AAQ-II 
showed excellent internal consistency in both the pilot (α = 0.95) and final experiment samples 
(α = 0.92).  
2.2.7 Positive and Negative Affect Schedule – Negative Affect (PANAS-NA) 
The PANAS (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) is a widely used 20-item self-report 
measure of positive affect (PA) and negative affect (NA). Twenty emotions are listed (ten 
positive emotions and ten negative emotions), and each emotion is rated on a Likert scale from 1 
(Very Slightly or Not at All) to 5 (Extremely). The ratings for each positive emotion are summed 
for the PA subscale, and the negative emotion ratings are summed for the NA subscale. Items 
can be answered with regard to current state emotion or with regard to the extent to which each 
emotion was felt over the past week; the former instructions were used in the present study. The 
PANAS has shown good psychometric properties, with good internal consistencies for both the 
PA (α = 0.89) and the NA (α = 0.85) subscales and strong model fit for a two-factor solution 
(Crawford & Henry, 2004). In addition, expected correlations have been shown between the 
PANAS and measures of anxiety and depression. PA correlates negatively, and NA correlates 
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positively, with depression, anxiety, and stress (as measured by the Depression Anxiety Stress 
Scales and the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scales; Crawford & Henry, 2004). The present 
study utilized the NA subscale as a measure of state negative affect. In the present study, the NA 
subscale showed excellent internal consistency in both the pilot (α = 0.94) and final experiment 
samples (α = 0.90).  
2.2.8 Toronto Mindfulness Scale (TMS) 
The TMS (Lau et al., 2006) is a 13-item self-report measure of state mindfulness, 
administered in the present study as a manipulation check to ensure that the online mindfulness 
audio clip affected state mindfulness.  The TMS correlates highly with other measures of 
mindfulness, and both the Curiosity (α = 0.89) and the Decentering (α = 0.85) subscales of the 
TMS have good internal consistency (Lau et al., 2006). Additionally, the TMS is sensitive to 
treatment effects; those undergoing mindfulness-based stress reduction have significantly higher 
scores on the TMS following treatment (Lau et al., 2006). In the present study, the TMS showed 
good internal consistency in the pilot sample (α = 0.88) and excellent internal consistency in the 
final experiment sample (α = 0.90).  
2.2.9 Worry Visual Analogue Scale (WVAS) 
Participants created a WVAS, a scale of current worry state rated on a scale from 0 to 
100. Consistent with McLaughlin, Mennin, and Farach (2007), participants were asked anchor 
the scale by generating a topic they are not worried about at all (anchor for a WVAS score of 0), 
a topic they are mildly worried about (anchor for a score of 25), a topic they are moderately 
worried about (anchor for a score of 50), a topic they are very worried about (anchor for a score 
of 75), and a topic they are currently the most worried about in their lives (anchor for a score of 
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100). They were asked to rate their current worry state at several times throughout the 
experimental procedure. The WVAS served as a manipulation check. 
2.3 Procedure 
The following description of the study procedure applies to both the pilot trial and the 
final experiment. The experimental procedure was identical for these samples. The pilot trial 
differed from the final experiment in only two ways: 1) 50 participants were recruited for the 
pilot, whereas 300 were recruited for the final experiment, and 2) pilot samples were not 
screened out based on scores on the GAD-Q-IV. All study procedures were conducted online 
through the Amazon Mechanical Turk and Qualtrics websites. The summary of study procedures 
for the pilot trial and final experiment is presented in Figure 1 and is described in the following 
section. 
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Note: asterisks indicate administration of the WVAS. 
 
Figure 1. Summary of experimental procedure. 
2.3.1 Experimental procedure 
Individuals first reviewed basic information about the study before they clicked a button 
to “accept the HIT.” They were then directed to a survey hosted on Qualtrics. The first page of 
this survey was a consent document; if they consented to the study, they were given the GAD-Q-
IV. For those in the final experiment, but not for those in the pilot study, Qualtrics automatically 
scored the GAD-Q-IV and excluded participants who did not meet the clinical cutoff. For those 
in the pilot trial, all procedures continued regardless of scores on the GAD-Q-IV. 
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As only those with GAD showed increased emotion dysregulation following a worry 
period in a previous study (McLaughlin et al., 2007), the final experiment included only 
individuals who met the criteria of analogue GAD. “Analogue GAD” is a widely used term 
referring to the samples of individuals whose scores on a standardized self-report measure 
indicate high likelihood of the presence of clinical GAD. This term is commonly used in the 
experimental literature in GAD (e.g., Farach, Mennin, Smith, & Mandelbaum, 2008; Salters-
Pedneault et al., 2006).  
Following consent and completion of the GAD-Q-IV, participants were asked to anchor 
their WVAS (see description of this measure). The WVAS served as a manipulation check 
throughout study procedures. Participants then completed other relevant self-report measures, 
including the DERS, PSWQ, FFMQ, and the AAQ-II. Just prior to randomization, all 
participants rated their current WVAS. Participants were then randomized to either worry for 
five minutes, or think about a neutral topic (i.e., no-worry control) for five minutes (Induction 1). 
Block randomization automized through Qualtrics was utilized to ensure that the groups were 
equivalent in size. Consistent with McLaughlin et al. (2007), those in the worry condition wrote 
three topics they are the most worried about, and then they listened to an audio file which 
instructed them to worry about these topics for the next five minutes. Those in the no-worry 
condition first wrote three things they did last weekend, and then they listened to an audio file 
instructing them to think about these topics for the next five minutes. Participants were not 
permitted to move on to the next part of the survey without listening to the entire five-minute 
audio file, although they were permitted to drop out of the survey at any time. At the end of the 
audio file, they were told that they can move on to the next part of the survey. See Appendix B 
for the scripts that will be delivered to participants in these two conditions, which are nearly 
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identical to the scripts from McLaughlin et al. (2007), with language changed to reflect the 
online nature of this study. 
Before the next induction, participants were asked to rate their WVAS as a manipulation 
check, and they were asked, “To what extent did you think about your assigned topics for the last 
five minutes?” with the option to provide a percentage score as an adherence check. Then, 
participants were randomized to one of three regulation strategy groups: mindfulness, thought 
suppression, and no-strategy control (Induction 2). The mindfulness group listened to a five-
minute mindfulness exercise involving instructions to notice breathing and encouraging 
nonjudgmental awareness of any thoughts or emotions that arise in the process of breathing. The 
script for this mindfulness exercise is based on the sitting meditation described by Kabat-Zinn 
(1990), which has been used in previous research examining the influence of mindfulness on 
emotion regulation (Arch & Craske, 2006; Feldman et al., 2010). The thought suppression group 
was instructed to list three topics that they would rather not think about, and then were asked to 
spend the next five minutes trying not to think about these topics. The script for the thought 
suppression condition was adapted from Marcks and Woods (2005). The no-strategy control 
group was asked to first list the last three movies they watched, and then to spend the next five 
minutes thinking about these movies. See Appendix C for the mindfulness, thought suppression, 
and no-strategy control scripts. 
Following the second induction phase, participants rated their WVAS. Then, all 
participants watched a 3-minute video clip from the 1931 film The Champ, in which the title 
character dies with his friends and inconsolable son watching. This clip is part of a standardized 
set of stimuli used to induce emotion in laboratory settings; it reliably elicits self-reported 
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sadness without eliciting other emotions (Gross & Levenson, 1995). This clip has previously 
been used to elicit sadness in participants with GAD (McLaughlin et al., 2007).  
Last, after viewing the film clip, participants rated their WVAS. Then they will complete 
the PANAS, to assess emotional reactions to the film clip; the DERS state version, to assess 
current emotion dysregulation; and the TMS, to assess state mindfulness as a manipulation 
check. Participants provided demographic information following the completion of all self-report 
measures. Finally, as an adherence check to Induction 2, they were given descriptions of the 
mindfulness, thought suppression, and control condition scripts, and they were asked to choose 
which of these describes what they did just before they watched the video clip. Then, after being 
told that they would still be paid if they did not follow instructions, they were asked, “To what 
extent did you follow the instructions you listened to before watching the video clip?” with the 
option to provide a percentage score. These adherence checks were given at the end of the survey 
to prevent participant exposure to alternate conditions.  
 Following the experimental procedure, all participants then viewed a video clip from I 
Love Lucy (i.e., the “Job Switching” scene) which was previously used to induce happiness in 
experimental research (L. Wang, LaBar, & McCarthy, 2006). This was to counteract the 
emotional effects of viewing the sad film clip. Participants were then provided a list of resources 
to access mental health treatment. 
2.3.2 Validity checks 
Online data collection methods may activate the online disinhibition effect among 
participants (Suler, 2004). Online disinhibition can be a boon to data collection of personal, 
sensitive information, such as mental health symptoms and problematic behaviors; participants 
are more likely to disclose such information honestly when they are anonymously entering data 
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into a computer (e.g., Lessler, Caspar, Penne, & Barker, 2000; Turner, 1998). However, such 
anonymity also may decrease prosocial behavior (e.g., Burnham, 2003; Haley & Fessler, 2005). 
Thus, it is possible that participants are more likely to act in self-interest in this online format, 
showing behaviors such as non-compliance with induction procedures or quickly completing 
questionnaires without careful review. To reduce this possibility, the present procedure also 
included a number of validity checks. 
First, the entire experimental procedure was estimated to take close to 45 minutes when 
questionnaires were completed with relative speed and accuracy. Qualtrics collected data 
regarding the time to completion for each survey; those spending less than 25 minutes or more 
than 90 minutes were excluded from data analysis. Second, to ensure that participants read every 
item in the questionnaires, one validity item was added to each measure; these items asked 
participants to rate the item at a particular value (e.g., “Please respond ‘sometimes true’ to this 
item’”). Participants with more than one error on these validity items were excluded from data 
analysis.  
2.4 Data Analytic Plan 
2.4.1 Analysis of covariance 
First, the assumptions of ANCOVA were tested. Specifically, assumptions of normality 
and homogeneity of variance were assessed by examining normal Q-Q plots and histograms for 
both dependent variables (i.e., S-DERS and PANAS-NA). ANCOVA’s additional assumptions – 
1) linearity of relationships between covariates and dependent variables, and 2) homogeneity of 
regression slopes of covariates on dependent variables will also be tested. Then, two 2x3 
factorial ANCOVAs were conducted to determine the effects of the two inductions – Induction 
1) worry versus control and Induction 2) mindfulness versus thought suppression versus control 
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– on emotionality (PANAS) and emotion dysregulation (S-DERS) following the film clip, 
controlling for differences in pre-induction measures (i.e., PSWQ, FFMQ, DERS, and AAQ-II). 
A Bonferroni correction sets alpha at 0.025. Main effects and interactions between Induction 1 
and Induction 2 will be reported for both dependent variables.  
2.4.2 Sample size estimation 
A power analysis for these tests was conducted using G*Power 3 (see Faul, Erdfelder, 
Lang, & Buchner, 2007). Although large effects have been found for the impact of worry on 
these dependent variables previously (McLaughlin et al., 2007), the effect of mindfulness 
following a worry induction on these variables is unknown; therefore, a medium effect size was 
predicted, f = 0.25. Power (1 - β) was set at 0.80, and Bonferroni-corrected α = .025. When set to 
detect interaction effects, the recommended total sample size with these parameters was 188 (n = 
31.3 per cell); a sample size of 188 detects main effects at 88% and 80% power for Inductions 1 
and 2, respectively. Because approximately 20% of cases are expected to be lost to attrition, and 
the extensive validity checks for MTurk data may exclude an unknown number of cases, the 
sample size for the present study was set conservatively at 300. 
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3     RESULTS 
3.1 Pilot Trial 
Before completing the final experiment, a pilot trial was conducted with 50 participants to 
examine whether the present mindfulness condition in fact had greater effects on mindfulness 
relative to the comparison conditions in an online sample. As noted above, pilot participants 
received an identical experimental procedure to those in the final study, except that they were not 
excluded based on the clinical cutoff on the GAD-Q-IV. 
3.1.1 Demographics and Descriptive Statistics 
The pilot group was mostly female (54.0%, n = 27), with 46.0% (n = 23) identifying as 
male. Participants ranged in age from 20 to 65, with an average age of 35.34 (SD = 11.23). With 
regard to race and ethnicity, 84.0% (n = 42) of participants identified as White or European 
American, 4.0% (n = 2) identified as Black or African American, 4.0% (n = 2) identified as 
Asian or Pacific Islander, 4.0% (n = 2) identified as biracial or multiracial, 2.0% (n = 1) 
identified as Hispanic or Latino/a, and 2.0% (n = 1) identified as Native American. Most 
participants identified their sexual orientation as heterosexual (94.0%, n = 47), with 4.0% (n = 2) 
identifying as bisexual, and 2.0% (n = 1) identifying as “Other: asexual.” The majority of pilot 
participants reported current full-time employment (60.0%, n = 30), with 20.0% (n = 10) 
reporting part-time employment and 20.0% (n = 10) reporting no current employment. With 
regard to marital status, 42.0% (n = 21) reported that they were single, 34.0% (n = 17) reported 
that they were married, 14.0% (n = 7) reported that they were currently cohabitating with a 
partner, and 10.0% (n = 5) reported that they were divorced. With regard to educational level, 
34.0% (n = 17) reported that they had attended some college but not obtained a degree, 34.0% (n 
= 17) reported that they had obtained a 4-year college degree, 12.0% (n = 6) reported that they 
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had obtained a high school diploma, 10.0% (n = 5) reported that they had obtained a vocational 
or technical degree, 4.0% (n = 2) reported that they had obtained a master’s degree, 4.0% (n = 2) 
reported that they had obtained a doctoral degree, and 2.0% (n = 1) reported that they had 
obtained a professional degree such as a JD or MD. Finally, 36% of participants reported that 
they had previously practiced mindfulness “a few times” (n = 18), followed by 28.0% (n = 14) 
reporting no history of previous mindfulness practice, 16.0% (n = 8) reporting that they had 
practiced mindfulness “just once”, and 20.0% (n = 10) reporting that they had practiced 
mindfulness “many times”. 
With regard to scores on the GAD-Q-IV, 74.0% (n = 37) of pilot participants met the 
clinical cutoff above 5.7. Scores on the GAD-Q-IV ranged from 0.00 to 15.73, with an average 
rating of 8.81 (SD = 4.33). Self-report measures generally correlated as expected (see Table 1). 
However, the TMS (post-experiment state mindfulness) did not correlate as expected with any 
measure. Specifically, state mindfulness did not correlate with self-report worry severity 
(PSWQ; r = .25, p > .05), trait emotion dysregulation (DERS; r = .24, p > .05), trait mindfulness 
(FFMQ; r = -.08, p > .05) or post-experiment negative affect (PANAS-NA; r = .26, p > .05). It 
correlated positively, and unexpectedly, with experiential avoidance (AAQ-II; r = .33, p < .05) 
and with state post-experiment emotion dysregulation (S-DERS; r = .34, p < .05).  
3.1.2 Manipulation Checks 
With randomization programming set to distribute participants equally across conditions, 
8 participants were assigned to worry/mindfulness, 10 were assigned to worry/thought 
suppression, 9 were assigned to worry/no-strategy, 5 were assigned to no-worry/mindfulness, 8 
were assigned to no-worry/thought suppression, and 10 were assigned to no-worry/no-strategy. 
WVAS ratings before and after the worry condition were compared to detect if the worry 
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condition was a successful manipulation in the pilot sample. Specifically, change scores on the 
WVAS before and after Induction 1 (i.e., the induction of worry or a no-worry control condition) 
were computed, and then the two groups (i.e., worry versus no-worry) were compared in an 
independent samples t-test. The worry condition WVAS scores increased significantly more (M 
= 20.07, SD = 22.15) than the no-worry condition WVAS scores, which decreased on average 
after Induction 1 (M = -12.09, SD = 18.98), t (48) = 5.46, p < .001. This indicates that those in 
the worry condition increased more in state worry than those in the no-worry condition, as 
expected.  
Scores on the TMS were compared for participants who were and were not in the 
mindfulness condition during Induction 2 (i.e., the induction of regulation strategies including 
mindfulness, thought suppression, and no-strategy control). Given the small sample size of the 
pilot group, the six experimental groups were collapsed into two groups for comparisons; those 
who received mindfulness, and those who did not. Participants undergoing mindfulness as an 
induction reported significantly higher subsequent state mindfulness than those in other 
conditions by an average 8.21 points, t(48) = 2.99, p < .01. Thus, the mindfulness condition 
appeared to successfully manipulate state mindfulness in the pilot sample (see Table 2 for means 
and standard deviations of mindfulness across the six study conditions in the pilot sample). 
Finally, WVAS ratings before and after the sad video were compared for all pilot 
participants with a paired-samples t-test to detect increased distress following the manipulation. 
As expected, participants reported significantly higher WVAS ratings following the sad video, 
indicating increased distress, by an average of 10.12 points, t (49) = 3.27, p <.01.  
Overall, all manipulations operated as expected in the pilot sample. Thus, the final 
experiment sample used an identical procedure to evaluate study hypotheses. 
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3.2 Final Experiment 
Five hundred and sixty-eight mTurk workers took the screening GAD-Q-IV at the 
beginning of the study survey; 300 participants received scores above the clinical cutoff of 5.7 
and were enrolled in the main experimental study. All enrolled participants completed the survey 
in its entirety.  
3.2.1 Data Cleaning and Validity Checks 
Validity checks were performed to exclude participants with potentially invalid data. First, 
participants were excluded from the analyses if they presented with more than one error on the 
six validity items administered in the questionnaires; errors indicate participants were not reading 
every item in the self-report measures. Multiple errors on validity items excluded 19 participants. 
Second, participants were excluded from the analysis if they incorrectly identified what 
condition they received in Induction 2, indicating that they did not pay attention during this task; 
this excluded 31 participants. Third, they were excluded if they reported less than 75% 
compliance with Inductions 1 or 2; this excluded an additional 38 participants. Finally, 
participants were excluded if they spent less than 25 minutes or more than 90 minutes on the 
survey. This excluded 12 and 3 participants, respectively, excluding a total of 15 participants for 
survey timing reasons. In total, these validity checks excluded 103 participants, leaving a final 
sample of 197 participants for data analysis. See Figure 2 for a visualization of participant 
exclusion. 
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Figure 2. Exclusion of participants. 
 
No additional data cleaning procedures were necessary. All participants provided complete 
data with no missing items. 
3.2.2 Demographics and Descriptive Statistics 
The final sample mostly self-identified as female (63.5%, n = 125), with 36.0% (n = 71) 
identifying as male and 0.5% (n = 1) identifying as “Other: bigender.” Participants ranged in age 
from 19 to 76, with an average age of 36.6 (SD = 13.0). With regard to race and ethnicity, 71.1% 
(n = 140) of participants identified as White or European American, 11.2% (n = 22) identified as 
Black or African American, 6.6% (n = 13) identified as Hispanic or Latino/a, 5.0% (n = 10) 
identified as Asian or Pacific Islander, 2.5% (n = 5) identified as biracial or multiracial, 1.5% (n 
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= 3) identified as Native American, 1.0% (n = 2) identified as Indian, 0.5% (n = 1) identified as 
Middle Eastern, and 0.5% (n = 1) identified as “Other: Central Asian.” Most participants 
identified their sexual orientation as heterosexual (86.3%, n = 170), with 7.6% (n = 15) 
identifying as bisexual, 3.6% (n = 7) identifying as lesbian, 1.5% (n = 3) identifying as gay, and 
1.0% (n = 2) identifying as “Other: asexual.”  
Most participants reported current full-time employment (54.8%, n = 108), with 21.8% (n 
= 43) reporting part-time employment and 23.4% (n = 46) reporting no current employment. 
With regard to marital status, 37.1% (n = 73) reported that they were married, 35.5% (n = 70) 
reported that they were single, 12.7% (n = 25) reported that they were currently cohabitating 
with a partner, 9.6% (n = 19) reported that they were divorced, 3.0% (n = 6) reported that they 
were currently separated from a partner, and 2.0% (n = 4) reported that they were widowed. 
Most participants reported that they had attended some college but not obtained a degree (38.1%, 
n = 75), with remaining participants reporting that they had obtained a 4-year college degree 
(34.0%, n = 67), a master’s degree (10.7%, n = 21), a high school diploma (10.2%, n = 20), a 
vocational or technical degree (5.6%, n = 11), a doctoral degree (0.5%, n = 1), a professional 
degree such as a JD or MD (0.5%, n = 1), or did not complete high school (0.5%, n = 1). Finally, 
most participants reported no history of previous mindfulness practice (40.1%, n = 79), with 
remaining participants reporting that they had practiced mindfulness “just once” (14.7%, n = 29), 
“a few times” (34.0%, n = 67), or “many times” (11.2%, n = 22). Of the participants who 
reported a history of mindfulness practice, 20 participants (10.2% of total sample) reported that 
they currently had an ongoing, regular (i.e., at least weekly) mindfulness practice.  
With regard to scores on the GAD-Q-IV, all participants enrolled met the clinical cutoff 
above 5.7. Scores on the GAD-Q-IV ranged from 6.24 to 16.98, with an average rating of 13.75 
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(SD = 2.36). Differences in compliance with study instructions across the six conditions were 
compared using a one-way ANOVA; there was no significant difference in compliance with 
instructions across study conditions (F (5, 191) = 1.84, p > .05). See Table 3.  Self-report 
measures generally correlated as expected (see Table 4). However, the TMS (post-experiment 
state mindfulness) did not correlate as expected with some measures. Specifically, state 
mindfulness did not correlate with self-report worry severity (PSWQ; r = .04, p > .05), 
experiential avoidance (AAQ-II; r = .132, p > .05), trait emotion dysregulation (DERS; r = .01, p 
> .05), or post-experiment negative affect (PANAS-NA; r = -.02, p > .05). It correlated 
positively, and unexpectedly, with state post-experiment emotion dysregulation (S-DERS; r = 
.16, p < .05). State mindfulness correlated as expected with only trait mindfulness (FFMQ; r = 
.15, p < .05). There were no differences across the six conditions in the covariates when 
examined in a series of one-way ANOVAs; there was no difference in trait worry (F (5, 191) = 
.57, p > .05), trait mindfulness (F (5, 191) = .67, p > .05), experiential avoidance (F (5, 191) = 
1.08, p > .05), or trait emotion dysregulation (F (5, 191) = .989, p > .05) across the six 
conditions.  
3.2.3 Assumption Checks 
3.2.3.1 Normality of dependent variables 
ANCOVA assumes that dependent variables are normally distributed; the S-DERS and 
PANAS-NA were both examined for skewness and kurtosis using normal Q-Q plots and 
histograms. Visual inspection indicated that both variables deviated from normality on normal 
Q-Q plots, and histograms of these variables indicated that both variables had acceptable kurtosis 
but were positively skewed. The S-DERS showed a skewness of .922 (SE = .173) and the 
PANAS-NA showed a skewness of .948 (SE = .173), both of which are outside the range of 
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acceptable normality. Specifically, dividing the skewness statistic by the standard error should 
yield a result less than +/-1.96, indicating 95% confidence that the skewness is not significantly 
different than zero. Both variables were far outside this range (S-DERS = 5.32; PANAS-NA = 
5.48). Thus, both dependent variables were transformed using a negative reciprocal 
transformation (-1/x), which was used to preserve directionality of effects, multiplied by 1000 
for ease of reporting. This transformation yielded acceptable skewness for both dependent 
variables (S-DERS skewness = .138, SE = .173; PANAS-NA skewness = -.299, SE = .173). Both 
variables were within the range of acceptable skewness after this transformation (S-DERS = 
0.79; PANAS-NA = -1.72) with normal Q-Q plots and histograms resembling a normal 
distribution. 
3.2.3.2 Homogeneity of variance 
ANCOVA also assumes homogeneity of variance in dependent variables across groups. 
Levene’s test was not significant for the S-DERS (F (5, 191) = .43, p = .83) nor the PANAS-NA 
(F (5, 191) = 1.09, p = .37), indicating acceptable homogeneity of variance for both dependent 
variables. 
3.2.3.3 Linearity of relationships 
Scatterplots for the relationships between each covariate and each dependent variable 
were examined for linearity. Specifically, Loess lines were examined for curvature and compared 
to linear lines superimposed over scatterplots. There was no evidence for polynomial 
relationships between covariates and dependent variables; all relationships appeared linear.  
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3.2.3.4 Homogeneity of regression slopes 
ANCOVA assumes that all covariates have similar regression slopes on dependent 
variables across levels of the independent variables. Homogeneity of regression slopes was 
tested by testing interactions between each independent variable (i.e., conditions for inductions 1 
and 2) and the covariate in preliminary ANCOVAs. In the first ANCOVA on the emotion 
dysregulation dependent variable, there was one significant interaction between Induction 2 and 
the PSWQ covariate (F (2, 187) = 5.50, p <.01), indicating that the relationship between worry 
severity and state emotion dysregulation was significantly different across levels of Induction 2. 
Thus, the PSWQ could not be used as a covariate in the ANCOVA on state emotion 
dysregulation. There were no other significant interactions on state emotion dysregulation. There 
were no significant interactions between covariates and independent variables in the second 
ANCOVA with state negative affect as the dependent variable, indicating that all covariates can 
be included in that analysis. 
3.2.4 Manipulation Checks 
3.2.4.1 Worry Condition Manipulation 
WVAS ratings before and after Induction 1 were compared to detect if the worry 
condition was a successful manipulation. Specifically, change scores on the WVAS before and 
after Induction 1 were computed, and then the two groups (i.e., worry versus no-worry) were 
compared in an independent samples t-test. The worry condition WVAS scores increased 
significantly more (M = 12.3, SD = 20.3) than the no-worry condition WVAS scores, which 
decreased on average after Induction 1 (M = -8.96, SD = 17.0), t (195) = 7.98, p < .001. This 
indicates that those in the worry condition increased more in state worry than those in the no-
worry condition, as expected. 
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3.2.4.2 Mindfulness Condition Manipulation 
TMS scores were compared with an independent samples t-test for those who were and 
who were not in the mindfulness condition for Induction 2. Contrary to expectations, those in the 
mindfulness condition did not report higher state mindfulness than those in the other conditions, t 
(195) = .538, p > .05. Neither the Curiosity (t (195) = .512, p > .05) nor the Decentering (t (195) 
= .715, p > .05) subscales were significantly different for those in the mindfulness condition. 
This indicates that the mindfulness condition did not successfully manipulate state mindfulness 
in the final experiment, despite successfully manipulating it in the pilot study (see Table 5 for 
means and standard deviations of mindfulness across the six study conditions). 
3.2.4.3 Sadness Manipulation 
WVAS ratings before and after the sad video were compared for all participants with a 
paired-samples t-test to detect increased distress following the manipulation. As expected, 
participants reported significantly higher WVAS ratings following the sad video, indicating 
increased distress, by an average of 9.66 points, t (196) = 5.86, p <.001.  
3.2.5 Analysis of Covariance 
The first 2 X 3 factorial ANCOVA was run to determine the main effects of worry (versus 
the no-worry control condition; Induction 1) and regulation strategy (mindfulness versus thought 
suppression versus no-strategy control; Induction 2) and their interaction on state emotion 
dysregulation, controlling for trait mindfulness, trait emotion dysregulation, and experiential 
avoidance (see Figure 3). Contrary to hypotheses, there was no main effect of worry induction (F 
(1, 188) = .183, p = .67, partialη2 = .004), no main effect of regulation strategy (F (2, 188) = .699, 
p = .50, partialη2 = .007), and no interaction (F (2, 188) = 2.14, p = .12, partialη2 = .022) in this 
analysis, indicating no experimental effect on state emotion dysregulation (see Table 6for 
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descriptive statistics of state emotion dysregulation across groups and Table 7 for a summary of 
ANCOVA results).  
   
 
Figure 3. Effect of experimental procedure on state emotion dysregulation 
 
The second 2X3 factorial ANCOVA was run to determine the main effects of worry 
(versus no-worry control; Induction 1) and regulation strategy (mindfulness versus thought 
suppression versus no-strategy control; Induction 2) and their interaction on state negative affect, 
controlling for worry severity, trait mindfulness, trait emotion dysregulation, and experiential 
avoidance. With Bonferroni-corrected alpha set at 0.025, contrary to hypotheses, there was no 
main effect of worry induction (F (1, 187) = .718, p = .42, partialη2 = .004), no main effect of 
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regulation strategy (F (2, 187) = 3.12, p = .046, partialη2 = .032), and no interaction (F (2, 187) = 
1.38, p = .26, partialη2 = .015).   
Given that an uncorrected alpha level of 0.05 would have found the main effect of 
regulation strategy (i.e., Induction 2) significant, the contrasts between conditions in their effect 
on negative affect were explored. There was no significant difference in negative affect between 
the no-strategy control and thought suppression conditions (M difference = -2.62, 95% CI = -
4.21 to 9.54, SE = 3.46, p = .450), and there was no significant difference between the no-
strategy control and mindfulness conditions (M difference = 5.48, 95% CI = -.857 to 11.82, SE = 
3.21, p = .09). However, there was a significant difference between the thought suppression and 
mindfulness conditions (see Figure 4). More specifically, those in the mindfulness condition 
showed significantly lower negative affect in response to the film clip than those in the thought 
suppression condition (M difference = 8.11, 95% CI = 1.44 to 14.77, SE = 3.38, p = .017). Table 
8 presents means and standard deviations across experimental groups on the PANAS-NA, and 
Table 9 shows a summary of ANCOVA results. 
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Figure 4. Effect of experimental procedure on negative affect 
 
3.2.6 Exploratory Analysis 
Although the negative affect subscale of the PANAS was a primary dependent variable of 
the final experiment, the entire PANAS was administered, including the positive affect (PANAS-
PA) subscale. Positive affect has received relatively less attention than negative affect both in the 
literature on GAD and the mindfulness literature. However, a recent longitudinal study suggests 
that low levels of positive affect predict GAD over time (Kendall et al., 2015), and people with 
GAD tend to dampen positive emotion (Eisner, Johnson, & Carver, 2009) and report high rates 
of fear of positive emotional experience (Roemer, Salters, Raffa, & Orsillo, 2005; Turk et al., 
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2005). Some extant literature suggests that mindfulness may increase positive emotional 
experience. A brief experimental induction of mindfulness has increased self-reported optimism 
and improved classification of positive stimuli (Kiken & Shook, 2011); experimental induction 
of mindfulness also increases food enjoyment (Arch et al., 2016). Those undergoing mindfulness 
meditation training also reported higher rates of daily positive emotional experience collected 
through experience sampling. (Geschwind, Peeters, Drukker, Van Os, & Wichers, 2011).Thus, 
an exploratory analysis was conducted to examine the effects of the experiment on positive 
affect. First, assumptions of ANCOVA were tested for the additional dependent variable.  
3.2.6.1 Normality of dependent variables 
The PANAS-PA was first examined for skewness and kurtosis using a normal Q-Q plot 
and histogram. Visual inspection indicated that the PANAS-PA did not deviate from normality 
on the normal Q-Q plot, and a histogram of this variable indicated acceptable skewness and 
kurtosis, with data conforming closely to a normal curve. Moreover, skewness was .304 (SE = 
.173); the skewness statistic divided by standard error was 1.74, within the acceptable range of 
+/- 1.96. 
3.2.6.2 Homogeneity of variance 
Levene’s test was not significant for the PANAS-PA (F (5, 191) = 2.02, p = .08). This 
finding indicated acceptable homogeneity of variance in this subscale. 
3.2.6.3 Linearity of relationships 
Scatterplots for the relationships between each covariate and the PANAS-PA were 
examined for linearity. Specifically, Loess lines were examined for curvature and compared to 
linear lines superimposed over scatterplots. Two relationships appeared polynomial in nature. 
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Specifically, the relationships between experiential avoidance (AAQ-II) and positive affect, as 
well as trait emotion dysregulation (DERS) and positive affect, appeared curvilinear in nature, 
and a quadratic curve superimposed over the scatterplots fit the Loess lines better than the linear 
relationships for both variables. Thus, product terms of the AAQ-II and the DERS were included 
in the ANCOVA analysis as additional covariates. There was no evidence for polynomial 
relationships between the other covariates (i.e., FFMQ and PSWQ) and positive affect; these 
relationships appeared linear.  
3.2.6.4 Homogeneity of regression slopes  
Homogeneity of regression slopes was tested by testing interactions between each 
independent variable (i.e., conditions for inductions 1 and 2) and the covariate on positive affect 
in a preliminary ANCOVA. There were no significant interactions between covariates and 
independent variables, indicating that all covariates can be included in the analysis. 
3.2.6.5 Analysis of covariance 
This exploratory 2 X 3 factorial ANCOVA was run to determine the main effects of 
worry induction (worry versus no-worry control; Induction 1) and regulation strategy 
(mindfulness versus thought suppression versus no-strategy control; Induction 2) and their 
interaction on positive affect, controlling for trait mindfulness, trait emotion dysregulation, and 
experiential avoidance. For this analysis, alpha was set at 0.05 in order to detect exploratory 
effects in a relatively unknown research area. As shown in Table 11, there was no main effect of 
worry (F (1, 185) = 1.34, p = .25, partialη2 = .007), no main effect of regulation strategy (F (2, 
185) = .22, p = .80, partialη2 = .002), but there was a significant interaction (F (2, 185) = 3.53, p = 
.03, partialη2 = .037). Although these results would not have been significant with a Bonferroni 
correction, which would have set alpha at 0.017, they were significant with the exploratory alpha 
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of 0.05. As Table 12 shows, post hoc pairwise comparisons demonstrated that there was a 
significant difference between thought suppression and mindfulness in the worry group (i.e., 
those who were instructed to worry in induction 1), such that those who had been worrying 
reported more positive affect after a mindfulness exercise than they did after thought suppression 
(M difference = 4.19, SE = 1.98, p = .035, 95% CI = .296 to 8.09). There were no other 
significant pairwise comparisons. However, those completing a mindfulness exercise were 
marginally better than those assigned to the no-strategy condition for the worry group (M 
difference = 3.46, SE = 1.93, p = .075, 95% CI = -.353 to 7.27), and those completing a thought 
suppression task were marginally worse for the worry group than the no-worry group (M 
difference = -3.79, SE = 2.11, p = .074, 95% CI = -7.95 to .376). See Table 10 for descriptive 
statistics of positive affect across experimental groups. See Table 11 for a summary of 
ANCOVA results. See Table 12 for all pairwise comparisons probing interaction effects. A 
visualization of these ANCOVA results is presented in Figure 5 
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Figure 5. Effect of experimental procedure on positive affect 
 
4 DISCUSSION 
The purpose of the present study was to evaluate whether a brief mindfulness 
manipulation reduces the impact of worry on negative affect and emotion dysregulation in 
response to an emotionally evocative film, and whether a brief thought suppression period 
increases the impact of worry on negative affect and emotion dysregulation. Specifically, 
hypotheses were that 1) those in the worry group, relative to those in a no-worry control 
condition (i.e., Induction 1), would have higher overall negative affect and emotion 
dysregulation in response to a sad film; 2) those in the mindfulness group, relative to the no-
strategy control group (Induction 2) would respond with lower negative affect and emotion 
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dysregulation, and those in the thought suppression group, relative to the no-strategy control 
group (Induction 2) would show higher negative affect and emotion dysregulation than the no-
strategy control; and 3) those in the worry condition would experience higher negative affect and 
emotion dysregulation in response to a sad film clip than those in the no-worry control condition, 
only if they were in the thought suppression or no-strategy control groups in Induction 2. That is, 
it was predicted that the worry condition and no-worry control condition groups (Induction 1) 
would not differ in key outcome variables if they experienced mindfulness in Induction 2, but the 
worry group would be higher in other Induction 2 conditions. 
4.1 Summary of Results 
The hypotheses of the present study were not supported. Using a Bonferroni-corrected 
alpha estimate, there were no main effects and no interactions between the effects of worry or 
regulation strategy conditions on negative affect and emotion dysregulation in response to the 
sad film clip. Using a less conservative alpha estimate (i.e., p < .05), one significant effect 
emerged from the planned analyses. There was a significant main effect of Induction 2 
(mindfulness versus thought suppression versus no-strategy control) on negative affect following 
the sad film. Post-hoc comparisons indicated that those in the mindfulness condition reported 
significantly less negative affect than those in the thought suppression condition, but not 
significantly less than those in the no-strategy control condition. Visual inspection of the data 
suggests that this effect was driven primarily by those who were in the no-worry condition for 
Induction 1, indicating that those in the no-worry condition may have benefitted somewhat more 
from a mindfulness manipulation than those who worried. However, this visual trend was not 
corroborated by a significant interaction between inductions. 
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Subsequent to finding null results for all hypotheses, exploratory analyses were 
conducted to examine the effects of experimental condition and their interactions on positive 
affect. With exploratory alpha set to p < .05, there were no main effects of either induction, but 
there was a significant interaction, such that a mindfulness exercise was followed by higher 
positive affect than thought suppression only for those who worried. That is, those who worried 
at Induction 1 and then underwent a mindfulness manipulation at Induction 2 experienced more 
positive affect after the film clip than those who worried at Induction 1 and then suppressed their 
thoughts at Induction 2, but those who were in the no-worry condition at Induction 1 did not 
show such group differences. Visual trends suggest that those in the no-worry control group at 
Induction 1 actually experienced somewhat less positive affect if they received the brief 
mindfulness instruction at Induction 2 than if they received thought suppression or no-strategy 
control instructions, but this difference was not significant. 
4.2 Lack of Effect of Worry 
The lack of a main effect of the worry condition (i.e., Induction 1) on negative affect and 
emotion dysregulation is contrary to prior research by McLaughlin et al. (2007), which showed a 
main effect of worry induction on negative affect and emotion dysregulation. Specifically, their 
team found that those with GAD experience higher negative affect in response to a sad film clip 
following a period of worry. In the present study, those who worried did not report higher 
negative affect or emotion dysregulation in response to the film clip than those in the no-worry 
control condition. This lack of effect does not appear to be due to lack of manipulation of worry; 
those who worried reported significantly higher worry ratings following Induction 1 than those 
in the no-worry condition. 
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Multiple factors might explain the lack of effect of the worry induction on negative affect 
and emotion dysregulation. First, the primary methodological difference between the present 
study (the final experiment) and the study conducted by McLaughlin et al. (2007) was the second 
induction. That is, the present study added the consideration of differing regulation strategies 
(thought suppression, mindfulness, and a no-strategy control condition; Induction 2) and 
examined how they might impact emotional reactivity following worry. The design of the study 
added an additional independent variable which might have impacted the two dependent 
variables; there was a main effect of the second induction on negative affect. Visual inspections 
indicate that potential interactions may have been found in a larger sample (see Interactions 
section); thought suppression appeared to increase emotion dysregulation for those in the no-
worry control condition at Induction 1, but not those in the worry condition. Although the 
interaction was not significant, those in the no-worry control condition may have been more 
dysregulated by the thought suppression condition than those in the worry-induction condition. 
This may explain the lack of group differences on outcome variables for Induction 1 (worry vs. 
no-worry control).  
It is also possible that the effect of worry induction on negative affect and emotion 
dysregulation found by McLaughlin et al. (2007) is a relatively brief, transient effect. In their 
study, the film clip was shown to participants directly after the worry period, but in the present 
study, the film clip was administered to participants following the second induction, which was 
five minutes long. It may be that simple passage of time following a worry period could reduce 
the impact of worry on negative affect and emotion dysregulation. Although the present study 
used a neutral condition as a control, it did not control for the simple passage of time. Emotion 
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is, by definition, a relatively brief experience (Rottenberg & Gross, 2007), and it is unknown if 
worry impacts emotional experience for longer than a few minutes at a time.  
Yet another possibility is that the effect found by McLaughlin et al. (2007) was specific 
to a diagnosed, clinical sample of those with GAD. In their study, they compared those with 
GAD to non-clinical controls, and found that worry only increased negative affect for those with 
GAD. Worry had no such effect on control participants. Given that the GAD-Q-IV correctly 
classifies 89% of those with GAD (Newman et al., 2002), it is likely that at least 11% of the 
present sample would not have been diagnosed with GAD by a structured diagnostic interview. 
Thus, some of the impact of worry may have been mitigated by the inclusion of a subset of 
participants who would not have met full clinical criteria. 
4.3 Mindfulness and Thought Suppression 
One main effect for regulation strategy (i.e., Induction 2) emerged from analyses in the 
final experiment; there was an effect of regulation strategy on negative affect when using an 
uncorrected alpha of p < .05. Post-hoc comparisons indicated that the mindfulness manipulation 
was associated with less negative affective responding than the thought suppression condition, 
but not less than the no-strategy control condition. There was a non-significant trend toward a 
difference between the mindfulness and no-strategy control conditions (p = .09), but no such 
trend for differences between the thought suppression and no-strategy control conditions (p = 
.45). There was no main effect of regulation strategy (i.e., Induction 2) on emotion dysregulation. 
The effects of mindfulness on negative affect and emotion regulation have been 
previously reported by Arch and Craske (2006). They found that healthy control participants who 
received a mindfulness meditation instruction reported less negative affect in response to 
evocative picture slides than those who engaged in a worry induction. However, they found no 
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reported differences between the mindfulness condition and their control condition, “unfocused 
attention”, on negative affect. These findings may be consistent with those found in the present 
study. Specifically, their study found a difference between mindfulness and worry, but no 
difference between the mindfulness and control conditions. In the present study, mindfulness was 
compared to thought suppression rather than worry; however, worry has been considered a form 
of thought suppression in itself (Borkovec & Lyonfields, 1993). The present study found a 
difference between mindfulness and thought suppression, but no difference between mindfulness 
and no-strategy control, in its impact on negative affect. There was, however, a trend toward a 
difference from the control condition. Overall, mindfulness was a better strategy for 
downregulating negative affect than a common strategy for people with GAD, thought 
suppression. 
Although the lack of difference between mindfulness and control conditions in negative 
affect is consistent with Arch and Craske’s (2006) findings, there was a trend toward a difference 
between them. Such a difference may have emerged for a more neutral control condition. That is, 
it is possible that the Induction 2 no-strategy control condition had an effect and did not operate 
as a true control condition, thus reducing the comparative effect of mindfulness. In fact, for 
Induction 1, the no-worry condition reported lower worry ratings over time in response to the 
induction, whereas the worry condition increased in worry ratings as expected (see Manipulation 
Checks). It is possible that the present experimental control conditions may have operated as 
distraction. Distraction involves intentional deployment of attention toward a stimulus other than 
that which is currently emotionally salient (Thiruchselvam, Blechert, Sheppes, Rydstrom, & 
Gross, 2011). Although the no-strategy control was nearly identical to the control condition in 
McLaughlin et al. (2007), the condition involved thinking for five minutes about the last three 
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movies participants had seen, which may have operated to distract participants from distress. In 
previous literature, distraction has reduced the intensity of emotion (Urry, 2010), reduced the 
unpleasantness of painful stimuli (Bantick et al., 2002; Valet et al., 2004), and attenuated 
dysphoric mood (Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993). Although the no-strategy condition 
was not significantly different than thought suppression, it is possible that an experimental 
control condition that was less distracting, such as allowing the passage of time, may have been 
significantly different than mindfulness.  
Mindfulness was not related to less state emotion dysregulation following the film clip. In 
fact, there was no main effect of regulation strategy (i.e., Induction 2) overall on state emotion 
dysregulation. This is contrary to Arch and Craske (2006), who found that mindfulness improved 
emotion regulation, more than worry and more than their “unfocused attention” control. 
However, they operationalized emotion regulation as willingness to view more negative slides, 
and they did not measure state emotion dysregulation by self-report. It is possible that their 
behavioral measure indicating emotion regulation measures a different aspect of the construct. 
The self-report measure used in the present study measures four dimensions of state emotion 
dysregulation: nonacceptance of emotion, difficulty modulating emotion, poor awareness of 
emotion, and lack of clarity of emotion. Willingness to view more negative slides may be related 
to nonacceptance, as acceptance of emotion and willingness to experience emotion have been 
considered similar constructs, often used interchangeably (Gratz & Gunderson, 2006; Twohig, 
Hayes, & Masuda, 2006; Twohig, Hayes, Plumb, Pruitt, & Collins, 2011). Willingness, however, 
may not be as closely related to the global state emotion dysregulation that was measured in the 
present study. It is possible that, in its immediate effects, mindfulness only influences some 
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aspects of emotion regulation. Future studies could examine the dimensions of emotion 
regulation which are affected by mindfulness meditation. 
It is also possible that a single five-minute mindfulness manipulation is not sufficient to 
affect state mindfulness in people with GAD to the extent required for emotion regulation. In the 
present study, those in the mindfulness condition did not report higher state mindfulness than 
those in the other conditions; the mindfulness condition failed to successfully manipulate 
mindfulness (see Limitations section). The mindfulness condition did affect state mindfulness in 
the pilot sample, but the pilot study included participants without analogue GAD. It is possible 
that those with probable GAD need more practice to receive the full benefits of mindfulness. 
Previous research has found benefits for mindfulness among people with GAD (Evans et al., 
2008; Hoge et al., 2014), but these studies were clinical trials where participants benefited from 
much practice in mindfulness meditation. No known study has examined the immediate effects 
of a single mindfulness exercise among people with clinical or analogue GAD, nor has a dose-
response study been conducted to date for mindfulness meditation in this population.  
It should be noted that there are varying forms and definitions of mindfulness in the 
current literature. To induce mindfulness, the present study used a focused breathing meditation 
based on a sitting meditation by Kabat-Zinn (1990) which has been used previously in 
experimental studies on mindfulness meditation (Arch & Craske, 2006; Feldman et al., 2010). It 
may be that the type of mindfulness that is induced with this meditation for people with GAD is 
not fully captured in the measure of state mindfulness used in the present study. One of the most 
widely accepted definitions of mindfulness posits that mindfulness is a process which arises from 
mindfulness training, consisting of two components: 1) “self-regulation of attention so that it is 
maintained on immediate experience,” and 2) “an orientation that is characterized by curiosity, 
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openness, and acceptance” (Bishop et al., 2006; p. 232). However, the state mindfulness measure 
in the present study, the Toronto Mindfulness Scale (TMS), has a two-factor structure 
inconsistent with that suggested by Bishop et al. (2006). Their measure yields two factors of 
mindfulness – Curiosity and Decentering (Lau et al., 2006) – neither of which capture the first 
component of mindfulness in Bishop et al.’s (2006) definition, involving the self-regulation of 
attention. Although it is possible that mindfulness was not successfully manipulated in the final 
experiment, it is also possible that participants’ self-regulation of attention increased; this change 
would not have been captured by the TMS.  
There is also evidence to suggest that mindfulness might operate differently with more 
experience. Mindfulness has been documented to impact emotional processing differently for 
experienced versus inexperienced meditators. Taylor et al. (2011) found that although both 
novice and experienced meditators reported lower reactivity in response to emotional images 
during mindfulness, these effects operated by different neural pathways. Novice meditators 
down-regulated activity in the left amygdala during mindfulness, indicating lower emotional 
processing while meditating. Experienced meditators, on the other hand, had no decrease in 
activity in emotional reactivity areas during mindfulness, but showed decreased activity in 
medial prefrontal and posterior cingulate cortices, indicating they allowed themselves to fully 
experience their emotional reactions to the pictures, and still reported less reactivity in response 
to them (Taylor et al., 2011). It is plausible that greater experience practicing mindfulness has a 
different effect on affective responding. However, it is unknown how much experience is 
required. Taylor et al. (2011) compared experienced meditators with over 1000 hours of practice 
to those who were experiencing mindfulness for the first time. It is possible that mindfulness is 
most helpful with over 1000 hours of practice, but the effect of mindfulness at varying doses has 
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yet to be examined empirically. Dose-response research for mindfulness meditation could 
provide direction for future research on the impact of mindfulness on emotion regulation. 
The impact of thought suppression in the present study is somewhat contrary to prior 
research. Results indicate that, as a main effect, thought suppression was not different from the 
no-strategy condition in its effects on negative affect and emotion dysregulation. This is contrary 
to previous studies which have found that those who suppress their thoughts have higher 
physiological arousal (Wegner et al., 1990), higher anxiety (Koster et al., 2003), and worse mood 
(Wegner et al., 1993) than experimental controls. However, experimental studies on thought 
suppression are primarily conducted on healthy control participants. There is only one known 
analogue experiment which investigated thought suppression in participants with clinical GAD 
(i.e., a clinical sample of those with mood and anxiety disorders) (Campbell-Sills et al., 2006). 
The thought suppression condition was related to higher negative affect than an acceptance 
condition following an emotionally evocative film. The present findings on thought suppression 
may be consistent with these findings; in our study, thought suppression was worse than a 
mindfulness condition which emphasized acceptance of experience. Campbell-Sills et al. (2006) 
did not include an experimental control condition, however. It may be that thought suppression is 
no worse than a control condition, at least in the short term, for people with GAD.  
The absence of difference between thought suppression condition and no-strategy 
condition in the present study may also be explained by the possible frequent use of thought 
suppression in the present analogue GAD sample. Thought suppression is already a regulation 
strategy of choice among people with GAD (Borkovec & Lyonfields, 1993), to the extent that 
participants with GAD can be distinguished from healthy controls based on their responses on a 
measure of thought suppression (Dugas et al., 1998). Thus, it is possible that the present 
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participants with analogue GAD engaged in thought suppression regardless of assigned emotion 
regulation strategy (i.e., Induction 2). Keeping participants with GAD from engaging in thought 
suppression in an experiment may be extremely challenging. However, a future study could add 
a measure of thought suppression to pre-induction measures, in order to control for overall 
tendencies to suppress thoughts and thus measure the additive effect of a thought suppression 
condition. 
4.4 Interactions 
There were no significant interactions for the planned analyses of the present study. That 
is, worry (Induction 1) and regulation strategy (Induction 2) did not interact in their effects on 
negative affect or emotion dysregulation, contrary to study hypotheses. However, visual 
inspection indicated trends toward possible interactions inconsistent with study hypotheses (see 
Figures 3 and 4). Consideration of these unexpected trends should be discussed and interpreted 
cautiously as these interactions were not statistically significant. However, the following 
discussion is warranted for future investigations.  
First, as Figure 3 shows, there was a possible small trend toward an interaction effect on 
emotion dysregulation (p = .12) with a small effect size (partialη2 = .022). Visually, Induction 2 
appeared to operate as expected for those in the no-worry group, such that they reported the 
lowest dysregulation in the mindfulness condition, followed by the experimental control 
condition. The thought suppression condition demonstrated the highest dysregulation within the 
no-worry group. However, those in the worry group showed a different pattern of results. In the 
worry group, the no-strategy condition demonstrated the highest emotion dysregulation, followed 
by mindfulness. Contrary to hypotheses, the thought suppression group showed the lowest 
dysregulation within the worry group.  
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Thought suppression is consistently linked to ironic effects in the literature, such that 
people who suppress their thoughts tend to experience paradoxical increases in the target 
thoughts (Wegner et al., 1987), as well as lower mood (Purdon & Clark, 2001) and higher 
anxiety (Koster et al., 2003), following a period of suppression of affect-related thoughts. 
Whereas the pattern of results for the no-worry group is consistent with this prior literature, the 
pattern for the worry group is not. Although the interacting effects of worry and subsequent 
thought suppression have yet to be examined in the literature, it is possible that thought 
suppression operates differently under different circumstances (e.g., following worry).  
One possibility is that worry enhanced the effect of thought suppression as a successful 
emotion regulation strategy, at least temporarily. Extant literature shows that participants who 
worry before encountering an anxiety-provoking stimulus experience lower physiological 
arousal and report lower initial distress in response to that stimulus (Borkovec & Hu, 1990; 
Wells & Papageorgiou, 1995). However, this effect is short-lived; worry is associated with lower 
habituation to those stimuli and higher intrusive thoughts about the stimulus in the following 
week (Borkovec & Hu, 1990; Wells & Papageorgiou, 1995). That is, worry appears to have a 
“rebound effect” on emotional experience. A similar “rebound effect” has also been documented 
in the thought suppression literature. A 2001 meta-analysis on the effects of thought suppression 
showed that the strongest effect of thought suppression was a subsequent “rebound” in the 
frequency of target thoughts (Abramowitz, Tolin, & Street, 2001). Their meta-analysis found 
that, on average, thought suppression did not immediately enhance unwanted thoughts, and that 
participants are able to successfully suppress thoughts over the short term. However, thought 
suppression was related to increased frequency of those thoughts over a delay. As such, it is 
possible that thought suppression is briefly effective under distress, but ineffective over time. It 
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is also possible that the 3-minute sad video was an insufficient delay to detect the rebound effect 
of thought suppression. From this perspective, the present findings may be consistent with the 
literature indicating that thought suppression is effective in the short term. 
With regard to the effects of conditions on negative affect, the interaction was also not 
significant, with little to no trend toward an interaction effect (p = .26). Patterns of overall 
response to the three conditions were similar across groups, with both worry and no-worry 
groups (i.e., Induction 1) reporting the highest negative affect in the thought suppression 
condition, somewhat lower negative affect in the no-strategy condition, and the lowest negative 
affect in the mindfulness condition. These patterns are consistent with the statistically significant 
main effect difference between the mindfulness and thought suppression conditions on negative 
affect. However, visual inspection indicates that mindfulness may have been somewhat less 
effective for those in the worry group than those in the no-worry group. That is, visually, the 
effect of mindfulness appeared to be driven by its effect on those who were in the no-worry 
control group (see Figure 4). 
The effects of mindfulness have never previously been examined immediately following 
a worry induction. These results indicate that following worry, mindfulness might not be as 
effective as it is following a period of neutral thinking. It is possible that the effects of the worry 
period contaminated the mindfulness period, because it may have been difficult for participants 
to switch from worrying to a mindfulness exercise. GAD is marked by uncontrollable worry; 
when clinically diagnosed, worry must be experienced as uncontrollable in order for a person to 
meet clinical criteria for GAD (APA, 2013). The very instruction in the mindfulness script that 
participants “switch from a mode of doing to a mode of nondoing” (see Appendix C) may be 
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exceptionally challenging for people with GAD immediately after they are instructed to actively 
worry.  
Although little research has documented that mindfulness is challenging during distress, 
this has been discussed theoretically. Hayes and Feldman (2004) discuss that mindfulness may 
have distressing, destabilizing effects because meditation may lead participants to become more 
aware of their own difficult emotions. In fact, mindfulness has been conceptualized as a form of 
exposure to internal experience (Roemer & Orsillo, 2002), and exposure-based treatments 
sometimes lead to a temporary worsening of symptoms (e.g., Gilboa-Schechtman & Foa, 2001; 
Nishith, Resick, & Griffin, 2002). Mindfulness may not actually operate to reduce short-term 
distress or increase regulation of emotions under distress. It is unknown if there are specific 
emotion regulation strategies can influence these processes under distress; a comparison of 
different strategies following worry could be a direction for future research. Additionally, if 
mindfulness operates similarly to exposure treatment, it may be most effective with practice. As 
discussed in the previous section, it is possible that mindfulness is most helpful with more 
experience; in this vein, future research could also examine optimal dosing of mindfulness. 
4.5 Exploratory Analysis: Effects on Positive Affect 
An exploratory analysis of the effects of mindfulness on positive affect found that, for 
those who worried, mindfulness was related to higher positive affect than thought suppression, 
and was marginally better than the no-strategy control condition (p = .075). Mindfulness did not 
increase positive affect in the no-worry group; on the contrary, positive affect was somewhat 
lower for this group. Unlike other results in the present study which found that mindfulness was, 
potentially, more helpful following the no-worry condition, the exploratory analysis found a 
benefit of mindfulness specifically following the worry period. 
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 In the tripartite model of anxiety and depression, high negative affect, high autonomic 
arousal, and low positive affect are predicted to combine to influence emotional disorders (Clark 
& Watson, 1991). Low levels of positive affect tend to uniquely predict major depression, more 
than they predict anxiety disorders (T. Brown et al., 1998; Watson et al., 1995). However, low 
levels of positive affect also predict the development of GAD in longitudinal research (Kendall 
et al., 2015). Tendencies to dampen positive affect predict symptoms of every anxiety disorder 
other than agoraphobia, including GAD, after controlling for depressive symptoms (Eisner et al., 
2009). Additionally, GAD symptoms correlate with higher fear of positive emotions (Roemer et 
al., 2005), and those with clinical GAD tend to report more fears of experiencing positive 
emotion than controls (Turk et al., 2005). Although positive emotion is not as well-understood in 
the anxiety literature as it is in depression, it is deserving of further exploration. 
 Mindfulness may increase positive affect. Theoretically, mindfulness is predicted to aid 
in “decentering,” or cultivating emotional balance (A. M. Hayes & Feldman, 2004) by promoting 
an attitude of acceptance of internal experiences. This approach is predicted to allow people to 
“return to baseline” following distress; thus, people are able to recover from negative emotional 
experience, making way for positive emotional experiences as they arise. In an RCT of 
mindfulness-based cognitive therapy for adults at risk for depression, those receiving the 
mindfulness treatment reported more daily positive emotions and higher pleasantness of 
activities than the waitlist control when monitored by experience sampling (Geschwind et al., 
2011). Another RCT using healthy controls examined brain activation across those experiencing 
an 8-week mindfulness meditation training program and those on waitlist control; they found 
higher left-side anterior activation in the mindfulness group, an area that is associated with 
positive emotion (Davidson et al., 2003). Mindfulness correlated with positive affect in a meta-
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analysis of 29 studies examining associations between mindfulness and trait affect (Giluk, 2009), 
and frequent meditators report higher positive affect than non-meditators (Beauchamp-Turner & 
Levinson, 1992).  
 The exploratory analysis of the present study indicates that mindfulness is uniquely 
helpful for positive affect following a worry period, but not following a no-worry control period. 
This supports the “decentering” theory of mindfulness. That is, mindfulness may make way for 
the full range of affective experience following a period of distress, allowing for the full 
experience of both positive and negative emotions. Although mindfulness does not decrease 
negative affect as strongly following worry, it may allow worriers to experience positive affect 
while they are still also experiencing negative affect. 
4.6 Limitations  
4.6.1 Manipulation of Mindfulness 
Although state mindfulness was successfully manipulated in the pilot sample, the 
experimental sample did not report higher state mindfulness when they were in the mindfulness 
condition. That is, receiving mindfulness instructions failed to manipulate state mindfulness, at 
least the one defined by the TMS, in the main experiment. This reduces the degree to which the 
effects of the mindfulness condition can be interpreted. For example, it is difficult to determine 
whether the null effects of the mindfulness manipulation on emotion dysregulation are due to 
lack of manipulation of mindfulness, or a true lack of effect of mindfulness on emotion 
dysregulation.  
 It is possible that the online data collection method interfered with the manipulation of 
mindfulness. When participants complete surveys in their own environments, factors that might 
be controlled in a laboratory setting (e.g., presence of others in their environment, availability of 
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distracting stimuli) cannot be controlled. However, other manipulation checks found that the 
worry condition and the sad video worked as intended in the present study. Multiple validity 
checks were included to ensure that participants were attending to the survey (see Data Cleaning 
and Validity Checks section). It is, however, still possible that participants did not sufficiently 
engage with the mindfulness manipulation in the main experiment. 
It is also possible that mindfulness was not successfully manipulated because the measure 
of state mindfulness was administered after the sad video and after measures of affect and 
emotion dysregulation. State mindfulness was measured several minutes after the mindfulness 
manipulation was complete. However, this was an intentional design choice, aimed at preventing 
the other conditions from being exposed to mindfulness-related concepts. Questions about 
mindfulness before the dependent variables may also have introduced demand characteristics, 
altering how participants responded to self-reports of negative affect and emotion dysregulation. 
With an identical design, including the same administration order of self-reports and inductions, 
the pilot trial did find an effect of the mindfulness condition on state mindfulness. Thus, it may 
be that other characteristics of the main experimental study influenced this lack of effect of the 
manipulation. 
 Specifically, the only methodological difference between the pilot and main experiment 
is that the main experimental study screened out participants who did not meet criteria for 
analogue GAD. Thus, on average, they had more severe anxiety symptoms than pilot 
participants. It may be that state mindfulness is difficult to manipulate for those with GAD. After 
all, the process of mindfulness, involving attention to the present moment with an attitude of 
openness and acceptance (Bishop et al., 2006) may be challenging for people who tend to avoid, 
judge, fear, and attempt to control their own emotional reactions (Mennin et al., 2005; Wells, 
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2004). However, the pilot sample did not have sufficient power to determine differences of the 
effect of the mindfulness condition on state mindfulness across those who did and did not meet 
criteria for analogue GAD. It is also possible that the successful manipulation in the pilot sample 
was a Type I error. Regardless, future research on the effects of mindfulness on GAD may 
require stronger doses of mindfulness in order to successfully manipulate state mindfulness (see 
Implications and Future Directions). 
4.6.2 Analogue Generalized Anxiety Disorder 
The present study used a sample of participants with analogue GAD. The measure used 
to screen out participants, the GAD-Q-IV, has 83% sensitivity and 89% specificity in detecting 
clinical GAD (Newman et al., 2002), indicating that it is likely that at least a subset of 
participants did not have GAD. Additionally, people on Amazon Turk may have been motivated 
to endorse GAD symptoms on the screening measure due to the description of the study and 
consent form, which discussed that it was a study for people who worry. However, the GAD-Q-
IV screened out nearly half of those who took the screening form (47%, n = 268, see Data 
Cleaning and Validity Checks). This indicates that a larger subset of screeners did not meet 
criteria for the study than would have met criteria in the pilot sample; 74% (n = 37) of pilot 
participants would have screened positive in the pilot sample. It is also notable that the pilot 
study was not advertised as a study for people who worry; rather, the description of the study 
referred to “ways of thinking and how they affect emotion.” It is still likely, however, that at 
least some participants in the main experiment did not have clinical GAD.  
The effects of worry on negative affect and emotion dysregulation have been found to be 
specific to those with GAD; worry does not increase negative affective responding or emotion 
dysregulation among healthy controls (McLaughlin et al., 2007). It is possible that some of the 
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null findings in the present study are due to the inclusion of some non-clinical individuals. 
Analogue samples are often used in basic laboratory studies of clinical phenomena (e.g., Fresco, 
Mennin, Moore, Heimberg, & Hambrick, 2014; Holaway, Heimberg, & Coles, 2006; Salters-
Pedneault et al., 2006), but it is always possible that the results of analogue samples will not be 
consistent with findings from diagnosed clinical samples. The lengthy diagnostic procedures, 
level of expertise required for assessment, and cost of recruitment can make basic laboratory 
research using clinical populations challenging. However, a future study on a similar 
phenomenon could include participants who do not meet analogue criteria, in order to detect if 
effects are specific to those who likely would meet criteria for a diagnosis; the present study only 
included participants who met analogue criteria. Establishment of an effect in an analogue 
sample that is not present in healthy controls could justify the resources required to recruit a 
clinical sample of people with GAD in a future study. 
4.6.3 Measurement 
It is possible that the self-report surveys used in the present study did not adequately 
measure the target dependent variables. It is also possible that the measure of state mindfulness 
did not adequately assess mindfulness in the current study. 
The negative affect scale of the PANAS is intended to measure negative affect broadly. 
This scale asks participants to rate the intensity they feel a number of negative emotions in the 
present moment, with ratings given for emotions such as “ashamed,” “afraid,” and “distressed.” 
However, this subscale does not allow for the examination of effects of the experiment on 
specific emotions, such as sadness or fear. The extended version of the PANAS, the PANAS-X 
(Watson & Clark, 1999), has subscales for specific emotions. However, broad increases in 
negative affect were expected in the present study; thus, the shorter version of the PANAS with 
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positive and negative affect scales was administered. However, the administration of multiple 
subscales of the PANAS-X, such as the sadness and fear scales, may have shed insight into 
processes of emotion which may have been impacted by the conditions of the present study. A 
future study would benefit from the assessment of more emotions following experimental 
inductions. 
The measure of state emotion dysregulation used in the current study is a validated 
measure of current emotion dysregulation (Lavender et al., 2015), but it may not have captured 
all facets of dysregulation that may have been impacted by the experiment. Specifically, 
mindfulness has been shown to increase emotional tolerance by behavioral measures of 
willingness to encounter aversive stimuli (Arch & Craske, 2006). Including multimodal 
assessment of emotion dysregulation may have allowed for exploration of multiple emotion 
regulation processes that are targeted by mindfulness. There are also physiological indicators of 
emotion regulation, such as heart rate variability (Appelhans & Luecken, 2006), as well as 
reductions in heart rate over time, indicating the “return to baseline” which is considered 
essential in theories of emotion regulation (Linehan, 1993). Although behavioral and 
physiological measures are difficult to administer and validate in online samples, an in-person 
laboratory experiment could add these metrics to examine the effects of worry, thought 
suppression, and mindfulness on multiple metrics of dysregulation.  
The measure of state mindfulness used in the present study, the Toronto Mindfulness 
Scale (TMS), did not correlate as expected with the other state measures administered after the 
induction period. In the main experiment, it did not correlate with negative affect or emotion 
dysregulation. The only measure it correlated with as expected was the trait mindfulness 
measure; this correlation was weak (r = .15) and was not present in the pilot. In the pilot sample, 
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the TMS correlated positively with state emotion dysregulation, and its only other significant 
correlation in the pilot was a positive relationship with experiential avoidance. This raises 
questions regarding the validity of the TMS as a measure of state mindfulness in this sample; it 
correlated with measures that are inconsistent with theory on the effects of mindfulness (A. M. 
Hayes & Feldman, 2004). The TMS has been validated as a measure of state mindfulness (Lau et 
al., 2006), and to date, there is no alternative measure of state mindfulness that has been 
validated in the literature. However, their validation was conducted with individuals with 
relatively extensive meditation experience, involving at least two months of regular meditation 
(2-360 months, M = 6 months; Lau et al., 2006). It may be that this self-report measures the 
effects of mindfulness for experienced meditators, but not for people who are relatively naïve to 
meditation. Additionally, the construct of state mindfulness may behave differently for people 
who are inexperienced with mindfulness; higher induced state mindfulness may not be linked to 
lower psychopathology, distress, or dysregulation for naïve practitioners.  
4.6.4 Online Data Collection 
The use of online data collection presents multiple limitations in the present study. First, 
the environments where participants completed the experiment could not be controlled, 
introducing potential confounds. Participants may be completing these surveys in a room with 
other people, while caring for children at home, while watching television, and so on. While 
completing surveys and undergoing inductions, they may have become distracted and inattentive 
due to uncontrolled factors in their home environments. Such variables could have been more 
easily controlled in a laboratory setting. The validity checks used in the present study were 
intended to exclude participants who were inattentive to surveys and/or disengaged with 
inductions. A large portion of the original sample was lost to these validity checks (34.3%, n = 
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103), indicating that many participants were not fully attending to survey tasks. Optimistically, 
these validity checks may have excluded most participants who were insufficiently attentive, and 
remaining issues with inattention should have affected participants equally across conditions due 
to random assignment. However, it is possible that the present experiment may have 
insufficiently accounted for poor attention; results may have been different in a controlled 
laboratory setting. 
 It is also difficult to administer some measures online that could have aided in 
multimodal assessment of dependent variables in the present study, as discussed in the previous 
section. Specifically, physiological and behavioral indicators of negative affect and emotion 
dysregulation may be difficult to deliver online. Interestingly, advancements in technology for 
analyzing digital video recordings have led to a procedure for measuring heart rate, respiration, 
and heart rate variability through webcam (Poh, McDuff, & Picard, 2011). This may have been 
difficult to gather using MTurk, as the procedure requires ambient sunlight and participant ability 
to record and send video with a webcam, but it indicates that future online studies could gather 
physiological indicators of the dependent variables in the present study. 
There are also specific limitations associated with using the Amazon Mechanical Turk 
(MTurk) platform for online data collection. MTurk has increasingly been used for behavioral 
experiments, and the typical MTurk worker has completed at least two experiments online 
(Chandler, Mueller, & Paolacci, 2014). However, some MTurk workers spend hours every day 
completing tasks on the website (Ipeirotis, 2010), such that MTurk becomes similar to a full- or 
part-time job. The most productive 1% of MTurk workers are responsible for completing as 
much as 11% of available tasks on the site (Chandler et al., 2014). Additionally, participants on 
MTurk may participate in communities online where they discuss their experiences with studies 
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on the website (e.g., mturkforum.com, turkernation.com). This has raised questions regarding 
participant “nonnaïvete” to the procedures of behavioral research on MTurk (Paolacci, Chandler, 
& Stern, 2010). Knowledge of the purpose of an experiment or of the intended effects of a 
manipulation may have unpredictable effects on participant responses (e.g., Edlund, Sagarin, 
Skowronski, Johnson, & Kutter, 2009; Rosnow & Aiken, 1973). For example, it is possible that 
participants in the present study had previously been exposed to the sad video used in the present 
study, as it is a validated stimulus for inducing sadness (Gross & Levenson, 1995). It is unknown 
if participants in the present study had previously been exposed to the experimental 
manipulations; a future study using an MTurk sample should ask participants about their prior 
knowledge of the experimental manipulations. 
Online data collection was used in part in the present study due to the need for a large 
sample to detect potential interaction effects; power analyses indicated that 188 participants were 
required for analysis. Recruiting such a large sample of those with analogue GAD may be 
challenging and time-consuming in a laboratory environment, and there is reason to believe that 
concerns about online data collection can be mitigated by potential benefits. Samples collected 
using MTurk, particularly, tend to be more diverse in age and socioeconomic status than 
university samples (Berinsky, Huber, & Lenz, 2012), and because the subject pool of MTurk is 
large (i.e., 500,000 workers) (Shank, 2016), MTurk may allow for easier access to specific 
population subgroups, such as those with analogue GAD. Experimenter bias and social 
desirability may also be mitigated for participants in online samples, where the experimenter is 
not present (Paolacci et al., 2010). Additionally, concerns about inattention may be unfounded 
for MTurk samples, as at least one study has shown that MTurk workers are less likely to fail 
attention checks than participants in the laboratory (Paolacci et al., 2010). Research on constructs 
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related to those examined in the present study has been conducted on MTurk previously, 
including studies on mindfulness (Hanley, Warner, & Garland, 2015; Jackson, Weinstein, & 
Balota, 2013), experiential avoidance (Bardeen & Fergus, 2015), and generalized anxiety 
(Lebowitz, Pyun, & Ahn, 2014; Price & Van Stolk-Cooke, 2015). However, it remains difficult 
to determine if factors specific to online data collection influenced the results of the present 
study. 
4.7 Implications and Future Directions 
Despite these limitations, results from the present study may have implications for future 
research on mindfulness and thought suppression among people with GAD. The primary aim of 
the present study was to detect if a brief mindfulness manipulation reduces the impact of worry 
on subsequent negative affect and emotion dysregulation. The present study indicates that a 
single, brief mindfulness manipulation may not have this hypothesized “buffering” effect for 
people with analogue GAD when they have been worrying. Brief mindfulness instructions may 
not actually operate to aid in emotion regulation under distress, in the immediate sense. Indeed, 
theoretically, mindfulness meditation may even be distressing and destabilizing in the early 
stages of practice (A. M. Hayes & Feldman, 2004). However, it could increase access to the full 
range of affective experience for those who have recently been worrying, allowing for increased 
positive affect, even though negative affect does not decrease substantially if worry is followed 
by mindfulness. The mindfulness manipulation did appear to reduce negative affective 
responding, but this effect appeared driven by participants who were not induced to worry. This 
indicates that there may be specific circumstances under which a brief mindfulness manipulation 
is an immediately effective tool for coping with aversive stimuli. It is possible that a mindfulness 
manipulation may be most helpful for downregulating negative affect when people with GAD 
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have not recently been worrying, whereas it may allow for both positive and negative affect to 
arise following worry.  
However, this possibility should be examined using a larger dose of mindfulness. In the 
present study, the five-minute mindfulness manipulation was not sufficient to affect state 
mindfulness in participants. This lack of effect on state mindfulness may have reduced the 
potential regulatory properties of the mindfulness manipulation. It is possible that simply 
increasing the length of time of the manipulation would have yielded effects on state 
mindfulness, but it may also be that people with GAD need to practice mindfulness multiple 
times in order to achieve benefits. This indicates that a dose-response study of mindfulness for 
GAD may be a necessary next step to guide further experimental research on the effects of a 
mindfulness manipulation in this population.  
The results of the present study also suggest that there may be specific circumstances 
where thought suppression, in the brief and immediate sense, is effective for emotion regulation. 
Interaction effects were not significant, but unexpected trends emerged from the data. Following 
worry, thought suppression appeared to decrease emotion dysregulation in response to the film, 
whereas thought suppression increased emotion dysregulation as hypothesized following a no-
worry control condition. These trends are surprising, and they indicate that those with GAD may 
be motivated to use thought suppression because it could aid in emotion regulation, at least 
temporarily. People with GAD likely use worry for a similar reason; in the short term, worry 
reduces negative affective responding and blunts physiological responding to stressful stimuli 
(Borkovec & Hu, 1990). If thought suppression reduces dysregulated responding to aversive 
stimuli following worry, its use may be maintained by negative reinforcement. For people with 
GAD in particular, a strategy that is useful following a worry episode may be strongly reinforced 
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due to the frequency of worry in this population. It is unknown if thought suppression would 
have had rebound effects over time; the present study did not include a follow-up to examine the 
longer-term effects of the experimental conditions. However, these results indicate that thought 
suppression in GAD is deserving of further exploration.  
First, an identical design to the present study, but without the comparison to mindfulness, 
may have increased power to detect significant results of potential interactions. The trends of the 
present study indicate that with increased power, interaction effects may have emerged regarding 
the effects of thought suppression on emotion dysregulation. However, indicating that thought 
suppression is helpful for short-term emotion dysregulation may be misleading without a follow-
up period, because it may not capture the longer-term rebound effects of thought suppression that 
have been reported in the literature (Abramowitz et al., 2001). Thus, future research should 
examine the effects of thought suppression following worry using a follow-up period to examine 
potential rebound effects on negative affect and emotion dysregulation.  
Future researchers may also consider adding multimodal assessment of the dependent 
variables used in the present study. Specifically, there are physiological measures of both 
negative affect (i.e., cardiac reactivity) and emotion dysregulation (i.e., heart rate variability; 
Appelhans & Luecken, 2006). Additionally, there are behavioral indicators of emotion 
dysregulation, such as willingness to tolerate an aversive stimulus, which may indicate increased 
emotional tolerance, an important facet of emotion regulation. Arch and Craske (2006) found 
that mindfulness did alter behavior on an emotional tolerance task, more than their “unfocused 
attention” control, even with a brief mindfulness exercise with inexperienced meditators. It may 
be that there are particular facets of emotion regulation that can be most effectively targeted by 
mindfulness in the immediate sense. Multimodal assessment of negative affect and emotion 
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dysregulation may help to rule out potential measurement issues, and would help to identify 
specific processes that may be targeted by mindfulness. 
4.8 Conclusion 
Findings from the present study indicate that mindfulness and thought suppression may 
operate differently than predicted on participants with analogue GAD following a worry episode. 
Mindfulness reduced negative affective responding to a sad stimulus as a main effect, but this 
effect appeared driven primarily by participants who were first in a no-worry control condition 
before the mindfulness condition. Mindfulness may be helpful for regulating negative affective 
responding in GAD, but it appears less useful immediately following worry. However, 
mindfulness was more effective at increasing positive affect following worry than it was 
following the no-worry control condition. This indicates that following worry, mindfulness 
allows for both positive and negative affect to arise in response to a stimulus. Following a neutral 
thinking period, mindfulness might downregulate negative affect and may also result in a small 
decrease in positive affect in response to a stimulus. These findings should be replicated with 
more rigor in a future study. Specifically, a future study should increase the dose of mindfulness 
in order to more effectively induce state mindfulness among participants. 
Trends on the effects of thought suppression were somewhat surprising. First, none of the 
effects of thought suppression were significant compared to control, indicating that thought 
suppression was no worse than a neutral thinking control condition for increasing negative affect, 
increasing emotion dysregulation, or decreasing positive affect among participants with analogue 
GAD. In fact, following worry, thought suppression appeared to somewhat reduce emotion 
dysregulation for participants. It may be that the delay following the thought suppression 
condition was not sufficient to detect the deleterious effects of suppression that have been 
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reported in prior research. Future research should examine the effects of thought suppression 
following worry using a paradigm that allows for the detection of rebound effects and longer-
term follow-up effects. It may be that participants with GAD use thought suppression because it 
is effective under some circumstances, despite the problematic results of chronic thought 
suppression that have been documented in the literature.  
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Table 1. Correlations among Measures in Pilot Sample 
 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Worry Severity (PSWQ) 
 
1.00       
2. Emotion Dysregulation (DERS) 
 
.770** 1.00      
3. Trait Mindfulness (FFMQ) 
 
-.652** -.861** 1.00     
4. Experiential avoidance (AAQ-II) 
 
.756** .855** -.734** 1.00    
5. State Mindfulness (TMS) 
 
.251 .239 -.079 .327* 1.00   
6. State Negative Affect (PANAS-NA) 
 
.431** .708** -.545** .663** .264 1.00  
7. State Emotion Dysregulation (S-DERS) 
 
.382* .594** -.416** .647** .340* .865** 1.00 
        
M 50.90 88.20 129.94 23.62 25.92 17.66 64.36 
SD 16.22 26.03 21.07 10.76 9.19 8.33 14.20 
Note. *p<.05, **p<.01, PSWQ = Penn State Worry Questionnaire, DERS = Difficulties in 
Emotion Regulation Scale, FFMQ = Five Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire, AAQ-II = 
Acceptance and Action Questionnaire – II, TMS = Toronto Mindfulness Scale, PANAS-NA = 
Positive and Negative Affect Scales – Negative Affect Subscale, S-DERS = Difficulties in 
Emotion Regulation Scale, State Version  
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of State Mindfulness (TMS) across Experimental Conditions in 
Pilot Sample 
 
  Induction 2 
  No-Strategy Thought Suppression Mindfulness 
Induction 1 No-Worry M = 27.90 
SD = 8.28 
n = 10 
 
M = 22.50 
SD = 9.06 
n = 8 
M = 32.00 
SD = 12.14 
n = 5 
 Worry M = 24.67 
SD = 5.55 
n = 9 
 
M = 19.90 
SD = 10.75 
n = 10 
M = 32.00 
SD = 9.09 
n = 8 
 Total 
 
 
M = 26.37 
SD = 7.12 
n = 19 
 
M = 21.06 
SD = 8.84 
n = 18 
M = 32.00 
SD = 7.48 
n = 13 
Note. TMS = Toronto Mindfulness Scale.Table 3. Descriptive Statistics of Compliance with 
Induction 2 across Experimental Conditions 
 
  Induction 2 
  No-Strategy Thought Suppression Mindfulness 
Induction 1 No-Worry M = 90.64 
SD = 7.87 
n = 36 
 
M = 95.18 
SD = 6.62 
n = 28 
M = 94.84 
SD = 6.26 
n = 39 
 Worry M = 92.27 
SD = 8.11 
n = 30 
 
M = 92.52 
SD = 8.39 
n = 29 
M = 93.83 
SD = 7.18 
n = 35 
 Total 
 
 
M = 91.38 
SD = 7.96 
n = 66 
 
M = 93.82 
SD = 7.63 
n = 57 
M = 94.36 
SD = 6.69 
n = 74 
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Table 4. Correlations among Measures in Final Experiment Sample 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Worry Severity (PSWQ) 
 
1.00       
2. Emotion Dysregulation (DERS) 
 
.398** 1.00      
3. Trait Mindfulness (FFMQ) 
 
-.357** -.785** 1.00     
4. Experiential avoidance (AAQ-II) 
 
.456** .766** -.580** 1.00    
5. State Mindfulness (TMS) 
 
.035 .005 .152* .132 1.00   
6. State Negative Affect (PANAS-NA) 
 
.225** .581** -.448** .563** -.019 1.00  
7. State Emotion Dysregulation (S-DERS) 
 
.160* .568** -.337** .520** .162* .721** 1.00 
        
M 67.0 105.0 117.4 30.7 27.7 20.5 69.2 
SD 89.2 25.7 20.4 9.24 9.87 9.37 14.0 
Note. *p<.05, **p<.01, PSWQ = Penn State Worry Questionnaire, DERS = Difficulties in 
Emotion Regulation Scale, FFMQ = Five Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire, AAQ-II = 
Acceptance and Action Questionnaire – II, TMS = Toronto Mindfulness Scale, PANAS-NA = 
Positive and Negative Affect Scales – Negative Affect Subscale, S-DERS = Difficulties in 
Emotion Regulation Scale, State Version 
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Table 5. Descriptive Statistics of State Mindfulness (TMS) across Experimental Conditions in 
Final Experiment Sample 
 
  Induction 2 
  No-Strategy Thought Suppression Mindfulness 
Induction 1 No-Worry M = 26.53 
SD = 9.52 
n = 36 
 
M = 26.43 
SD = 10.22 
n = 28 
M = 24.87 
SD = 11.25 
n = 39 
 Worry M = 30.07 
SD = 9.02 
n = 30 
 
M = 26.52 
SD = 7.79 
n = 29 
M = 31.80 
SD = 9.42 
n = 35 
 Total 
 
 
M = 28.14 
SD = 9.40 
n = 66 
 
M = 26.47 
SD = 8.99 
n = 57 
M = 28.15 
SD = 10.93 
n = 74 
Note. TMS = Toronto Mindfulness Scale.  
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Table 6. Descriptive Statistics of State Emotion Dysregulation (S-DERS) across Experimental 
Conditions 
 
  Induction 2 
  No-Strategy Thought Suppression Mindfulness 
Induction 1 No-Worry M = 69.17 
SD = 12.94 
n = 36 
 
M = 75.43 
SD = 16.62 
n = 28 
M = 66.21 
SD = 12.14 
n = 39 
 Worry M = 69.97 
SD = 14.25 
n = 30 
 
M = 66.07 
SD = 11.99 
n = 29 
M = 69.62 
SD = 15.15 
n = 35 
 Total 
 
 
M = 69.53 
SD = 13.45 
n = 66 
 
M = 70.66 
SD = 15.08 
n = 57 
M = 67.82 
SD = 13.66 
n = 74 
Note. S-DERS = Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale – State Version. Reported means and 
standard deviations use raw scores on this measure; ANCOVA analyses used a negative 
reciprocal transformation. 
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Table 7. Results of ANCOVA Analysis of Effects of Experimental Conditions on State Emotion 
Dysregulation (S-DERS) 
 F p ɳp2 
Main Effects    
   Induction 1 
 
.183 .669 .001 
   Induction 2 
 
.699 .499 .007 
Interaction    
   Induction 1 x Induction 2 
 
2.14 .121 .022 
Covariates    
   Trait Mindfulness (FFMQ) 
 
7.62 .006 .039 
   Experiential Avoidance (AAQ-II) 
 
5.33 .022 .028 
   Trait Emotion Dysregulation (DERS) 
 
25.98 .000 .121 
Note. Induction 1 = Worry versus Neutral. Induction 2 = Worry versus Neutral versus Thought 
Suppression. S-DERS = Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale, State Version. FFMQ = Five 
Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire. AAQ-II = Acceptance and Action Questionnaire – II. DERS = 
Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale.  
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Table 8. Descriptive Statistics of State Negative Affect (PANAS-NA) across Experimental 
Conditions 
  Induction 2 
  No-Strategy Thought Suppression Mindfulness 
Induction 1 No-Worry M = 20.83 
SD = 9.18 
n = 36 
 
M = 25.04 
SD = 11.41 
n = 28 
M = 17.46 
SD = 7.38 
n = 39 
 Worry M = 21.40 
SD = 10.45 
n = 30 
 
M = 19.45 
SD = 8.48 
n = 29 
M = 20.17 
SD = 8.54 
n = 35 
 Total 
 
 
M = 21.09 
SD = 9.70 
n = 66 
 
M = 22.19 
SD = 10.33 
n = 57 
M = 18.74 
SD = 8.01 
n = 74 
Note. PANAS-NA = Positive and Negative Affect Scale – Negative Affect.  Reported means and 
standard deviations use raw scores on this measure; ANCOVA analyses used a negative 
reciprocal transformation. 
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Table 9. Results of ANCOVA Analysis of Effects of Experimental Conditions on Negative Affect 
(PANAS-NA) 
 
 F p ɳp2 
Main Effects    
   Induction 1 
 
.718 .398 .004 
   Induction 2 
 
3.12 .046 .032 
Interaction    
   Induction 1 x Induction 2 
 
1.38 .255 .015 
Covariates    
   Trait Mindfulness (FFMQ) 
 
.537 .465 .003 
   Experiential Avoidance (AAQ-II) 
 
14.29 .000 .071 
   Trait Emotion Dysregulation (DERS) 
 
5.21 .024 .027 
   Worry Severity (PSWQ) 
 
.459 .499 .002 
Note. Induction 1 = Worry versus Neutral. Induction 2 = Worry versus Neutral versus Thought 
Suppression. PANAS-NA = Positive and Negative Affect Scale – Negative Affect. FFMQ = Five 
Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire. AAQ-II = Acceptance and Action Questionnaire – II. DERS = 
Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale. PSWQ = Penn State Worry Questionnaire.  
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Table 10. Descriptive Statistics of State Positive Affect (PANAS-PA) across Experimental 
Conditions 
 
  Induction 2 
   No-Strategy Thought Suppression Mindfulness 
Induction 1 No-Worry M = 25.89 
SD = 8.81 
n = 36 
 
M = 26.43 
SD = 8.06 
n = 28 
M = 23.49 
SD = 10.14 
n = 39 
 Worry M = 23.83 
SD = 8.04 
n = 30 
 
M = 23.27 
SD = 6.56 
n = 29 
M = 26.82 
SD = 7.76 
n = 35 
 Total 
 
 
M = 24.95 
SD = 8.47 
n = 66 
 
M = 24.82 
SD = 7.44 
n = 57 
M = 25.07 
SD = 9.19 
n = 74 
Note. PANAS-PA = Positive and Negative Affect Scale – Positive Affect.   
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Table 11. Results of ANCOVA Analysis of Effects of Experimental Conditions on Positive Affect 
(PANAS-PA)  
 
 F p ɳp2 
Main Effects    
   Induction 1 
 
1.34 .248 .007 
   Induction 2 
 
.221 .802 .002 
Interaction    
   Induction 1 x Induction 2 
 
3.53 .031 .037 
Covariates    
   Trait Mindfulness (FFMQ) 
 
7.09 .008 .037 
   Experiential Avoidance (AAQ-II) 
 
.497 .482 .003 
   Product Term of Experiential Avoidance     (AAQ-II) 
 
.353 .553 .002 
   Trait Emotion Dysregulation (DERS) 
 
.688 .408 .004 
   Product Term of Trait Emotion Dysregulation (DERS) 
 
.869 .352 .005 
   Worry Severity (PSWQ) 
 
2.30 .131 .012 
Note. Induction 1 = Worry versus Neutral. Induction 2 = Worry versus Neutral versus Thought 
Suppression. PANAS-PA = Positive and Negative Affect Scale – Positive Affect. FFMQ = Five 
Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire. AAQ-II = Acceptance and Action Questionnaire – II. DERS = 
Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale. PSWQ = Penn State Worry Questionnaire. 
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Table 12. Pairwise Comparisons of Interaction Effects on Positive Affect 
 
 M Difference Standard Error p 
No-Worry (Induction 1)    
          MF vs. TS -2.41 1.98 .225 
          MF vs. No-Strategy -2.31 1.81 .203 
          TS vs. No-Strategy .099 1.99 .961 
Worry (Induction 1)    
          MF vs. TS 4.20 1.98 .035 
          MF vs. No-Strategy 3.46 1.93 .075 
          TS vs. No-Strategy -.739 2.05 .719 
Mindfulness (Induction 2)    
          Worry vs. No-Worry 2.82 1.81 .123 
Thought Suppression (Induction 2)    
          Worry vs. No-Worry -3.79 2.11 .074 
Neutral (Induction 2)    
          Worry vs. No-Worry -2.95 1.94 .130 
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Appendix A 
GAD-Q-IV  
1. Do you experience excessive worry?  __Yes   __No  
2. Is your worry excessive in intensity, frequency, or amount of distress it causes?   __Yes__ No  
3. Do you find it difficult to control your worry (or stop worrying) once it starts? __Yes __No  
4. Do you worry excessively and uncontrollably about minor things such as being late for an 
appointment, minor repairs, homework, etc.? __Yes  __No  
5. Please list the most frequent topics about which you worry excessively and uncontrollably:  
A. ____________________ B. ____________________ C. _______________________  
D. ____________________ E. ____________________ F. _______________________  
6. During the last six months, have you been bothered by excessive and uncontrollable worries more 
days than not? __Yes  __No  
IF YES, CONTINUE. IF NO, SKIP REMAINING QUESTIONS.  
7. During the past six months, have you often been bothered by any of the following symptoms? 
Place a check next to each symptom that you have had more days than not:  
__ Restlessness or feeling keyed up or on edge    __ Difficulty falling/staying asleep or 
restless/unsatisfying sleep  
__ Difficulty concentrating or mind going blank  __ Irritability  
__ Being easily fatigued           __ Muscle tension  
8. How much do worry and physical symptoms interfere with your life, work, social activities, 
family, etc.? Circle one number:  
0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  
          None           Mildly      Moderately          Severely      Very Severely  
9. How much are you bothered by worry and physical symptoms (how much distress does it cause 
you)? Circle one number:  
0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  
             No             Mild       Moderate           Severe        Very Severe  
        Distress         Distress        Distress         Distress           Distress 
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The Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ) 
 
Instructions: Rate each of the following statements on a scale of 1 (“not at all typical of me”) to 5 (“very 
typical of me”). Please do not leave any items blank. 
 
 
 
 Not at all typical               Very typical                            
of me                    of me 
 
1. If I do not have enough time to do everything, 
I do not worry about it. 
 
 1   2    3     4       5 
 
2. My worries overwhelm me. 1   2    3     4       5 
 
3. I do not tend to worry about things. 1   2    3     4       5 
 
4. Many situations make me worry. 1   2    3     4       5 
 
5. I know I should not worry about things, but 
I just cannot help it. 
 
1   2    3     4       5 
 
6. When I am under pressure I worry a lot. 
 
1   2    3     4       5 
 
7. I am always worrying about something. 
 
1   2    3     4       5 
 
8. I find it easy to dismiss worrisome thoughts. 
 
1   2    3     4       5 
 
9. As soon as I finish one task, I start to worry 
about everything else I have to do. 
 
1   2    3     4       5 
 
10. I never worry about anything. 
 
1   2    3     4       5 
 
11. When there is nothing more I can do about a 
concern, I do not worry about it any more. 
 
1   2    3     4       5 
 
12. I have been a worrier all my life. 
 
1   2    3     4       5 
 
13. I notice that I have been worrying about 
things. 
 
1   2    3     4       5 
 
14. Once I start worrying, I cannot stop. 
 
1   2    3     4       5 
 
15. I worry all the time. 
 
1   2    3     4       5 
 
16. I worry about projects until they are all done. 
 
1   2    3     4       5 
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DERS 
Please indicate how often the following 36 statements apply to you by writing the 
appropriate number from the scale below (1 – 5) on the line alongside each item. 
Response categories: 
 1 Almost never (0-10%) 
 2 Sometimes (11-35%) 
 3 About half the time (36-65%) 
 4 Most of the time (66 – 90%) 
 5 Almost always (91-100%) 
 
___ 1. I am clear about my feelings. 
___ 2. I pay attention to how I feel. 
___ 3. I experience my emotions as overwhelming and out of control. 
___ 4. I have no idea how I am feeling. 
___ 5. I have difficulty making sense out of my feelings. 
___ 6. I am attentive to my feelings. 
___ 7. I know exactly how I am feeling. 
___ 8. I care about what I am feeling. 
___ 9. I am confused about how I feel. 
___ 10. When I’m upset, I acknowledge my emotions. 
___ 11. When I’m upset, I become angry with myself for feeling that way. 
___ 12. When I’m upset, I become embarrassed for feeling that way. 
___ 13. When I’m upset, I have difficulty getting work done. 
___ 14. When I’m upset, I become out of control. 
___ 15. When I'm upset, I believe that I will remain that way for a long time. 
___ 16. When I'm upset, I believe that I'll end up feeling very depressed. 
___ 17. When I'm upset, I believe that my feelings are valid and important. 
___ 18. When I'm upset, I have difficulty focusing on other things. 
___ 19. When I'm upset, I feel out of control. 
___ 20. When I'm upset, I can still get things done. 
___ 21. When I'm upset, I feel ashamed with myself for feeling that way. 
___ 22. When I'm upset, I know that I can find a way to eventually feel better. 
___ 23. When I'm upset, I feel like I am weak. 
___ 24. When I'm upset, I feel like I can remain in control of my behaviors. 
___ 25. When I'm upset, I feel guilty for feeling that way. 
___ 26. When I'm upset, I have difficulty concentrating. 
___ 27. When I'm upset, I have difficulty controlling my behaviors. 
___ 28. When I'm upset, I believe there is nothing I can do to make myself feel better. 
___ 29. When I'm upset, I become irritated with myself for feeling that way. 
___ 30. When I'm upset, I start to feel very bad about myself. 
___ 31. When I'm upset, I believe that wallowing in it is all I can do. 
___ 32. When I'm upset, I lose control over my behaviors. 
___ 33. When I'm upset, I have difficulty thinking about anything else. 
___ 34. When I'm upset, I take time to figure out what I'm really feeling. 
___ 35. When I'm upset, it takes me a long time to feel better. 
___ 36. When I'm upset, my emotions feel overwhelming. 
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TMS 
We are interested in what you just experienced. Below is a list of things that people sometimes experience.  Fill in a 
numbered bubble next to each statement according to the following scale: 0 = Not at all;  1 = A little; 2 = Moderately; 3 
= Quite a bit; 4 = Very Much. 
 
 Not 
at all 
A 
little  
Moderately Quite 
a bit 
Very 
much 
1.    I experienced myself as separate from my changing thoughts 
and feelings 
0                 
2.     I was more concerned with being open to my experiences than 
controlling or changing them. 
0                 
3.     I was curious about what I might learn about myself by taking 
notice of how I react to certain thoughts, feelings or 
sensations. 
0                 
4.     I experienced my thoughts more as events in my mind than as 
a necessarily accurate reflection of the way things ‘really’ 
are. 
0                 
5.     I was curious to see what my mind was up to from moment to 
moment. 
0                 
6.    I was curious about each of the thoughts and feelings that I was 
having. 
0                 
7.     I was receptive to observing unpleasant thoughts and feelings 
without interfering with them 
0                 
8.     I was more invested in just watching my experiences as they 
arose, than in figuring out what they could mean. 
0                 
9.    I approached each experience by trying to accept it, no matter 
whether it was pleasant or unpleasant. 
0                 
10.    I remained curious about the nature of each experience as it 
arose. 
0                 
11.    I was aware of my thoughts and feelings without 
overidentifying with them. 
0                 
12.   I was curious about my reactions to things. 0                 
13.  I was curious about what I might learn about myself by just 
taking notice of what my attention gets drawn to. 
0                 
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S-DERS 
Please read each statement and indicate how much it applies to you RIGHT NOW.  Fill in a numbered bubble next to 
each statement according to the following scale: 1 = Not at all;   2 = Somewhat; 3 = Moderately; 4 = Very Much; 5 = 
Completely. 
 
 
 Not    at 
all  
Some-
what  
Moderately Very 
Much  Com
pletely 
1.     I feel guilty for feeling this way. 
                        
2.     I am paying attention to how I feel. 
                        
3.     I feel out of control. 
                        
4.     I am embarrassed for feeling this way. 
                        
5.     I am feeling very bad about myself. 
                        
6.    I am acknowledging my emotions. 
                        
7.     I have no idea how I am feeling. 
                        
8.     I feel ashamed with myself for feeling this way. 
                        
9.    I am having difficulty doing the things I need to do 
right now. 
                        
10.    I believe that I will continue feeling this way for a 
long time. 
                        
11.    I care about what I am feeling. 
                        
12.   I am angry with myself for feeling this way. 
                        
13.  I am having difficulty controlling my behaviors. 
                        
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14 .  I am confused about how I feel. 
                        
15.   I believe that I am going to end up feeling very 
depressed. 
                        
16.   I am taking time to figure out what I am really 
feeling. 
                        
17.  My emotions feel out of control. 
                        
18.   I am irritated with myself for feeling this way. 
                        
19.  I believe that my feelings are valid and important. 
                        
20.  I feel like I’m a weak person for feeling this way. 
                        
21.  My emotions feel overwhelming. 
                        
1 
FFMQ 
Please rate each of the following statements using the scale provided.  Write the number in the 
blank that best describes your own opinion of what is generally true for you. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
never or very 
rarely true 
rarely 
true 
sometimes 
true 
often 
true 
very often or 
always true 
 
_____ 1.  When I’m walking, I deliberately notice the sensations of my body moving. 
_____ 2.  I’m good at finding words to describe my feelings. 
_____ 3.  I criticize myself for having irrational or inappropriate emotions. 
_____ 4.  I perceive my feelings and emotions without having to react to them. 
_____ 5.  When I do things, my mind wanders off and I’m easily distracted. 
_____ 6.  When I take a shower or bath, I stay alert to the sensations of water on my body. 
_____ 7.  I can easily put my beliefs, opinions, and expectations into words. 
_____ 8.  I don’t pay attention to what I’m doing because I’m daydreaming, worrying, or 
  otherwise distracted. 
_____ 9.  I watch my feelings without getting lost in them. 
_____ 10. I tell myself I shouldn’t be feeling the way I’m feeling. 
_____ 11. I notice how foods and drinks affect my thoughts, bodily sensations, and emotions. 
_____ 12. It’s hard for me to find the words to describe what I’m thinking. 
_____ 13. I am easily distracted. 
_____ 14. I believe some of my thoughts are abnormal or bad and I shouldn’t think that way. 
_____ 15. I pay attention to sensations, such as the wind in my hair or sun on my face. 
_____ 16. I have trouble thinking of the right words to express how I feel about things 
_____ 17. I make judgments about whether my thoughts are good or bad. 
_____ 18. I find it difficult to stay focused on what’s happening in the present. 
_____ 19. When I have distressing thoughts or images, I “step back” and am aware of the   
 thought or image without getting taken over by it. 
_____ 20. I pay attention to sounds, such as clocks ticking, birds chirping, or cars passing. 
_____ 21. In difficult situations, I can pause without immediately reacting. 
_____ 22. When I have a sensation in my body, it’s difficult for me to describe it because I can’t 
  find the right words. 
PLEASE TURN OVER    
 
 
2 
1 2 3 4 5 
never or very 
rarely true 
rarely 
true 
sometimes 
true 
often 
true 
very often or 
always true 
 
_____ 23. It seems I am “running on automatic” without much awareness of what I’m doing. 
 _____24. When I have distressing thoughts or images, I feel calm soon after. 
_____ 25. I tell myself that I shouldn’t be thinking the way I’m thinking. 
_____ 26. I notice the smells and aromas of things. 
_____ 27. Even when I’m feeling terribly upset, I can find a way to put it into words. 
_____ 28. I rush through activities without being really attentive to them. 
_____ 29. When I have distressing thoughts or images I am able just to notice them without 
  reacting. 
_____ 30. I think some of my emotions are bad or inappropriate and I shouldn’t feel them. 
_____ 31. I notice visual elements in art or nature, such as colors, shapes, textures, or patterns of 
  light and shadow. 
_____ 32. My natural tendency is to put my experiences into words. 
_____ 33. When I have distressing thoughts or images, I just notice them and let them go. 
_____ 34. I do jobs or tasks automatically without being aware of what I’m doing. 
_____ 35. When I have distressing thoughts or images, I judge myself as good or bad, depending 
  what the thought/image is about. 
_____ 36. I pay attention to how my emotions affect my thoughts and behavior. 
_____ 37. I can usually describe how I feel at the moment in considerable detail. 
_____ 38. I find myself doing things without paying attention. 
_____ 39. I disapprove of myself when I have irrational ideas. 
  
3 
AAQ-II 
Below you will find a list of statements. Please rate how true each statement is for you by 
circling a number next to it. Use the scale below to make your choice.  
 
 
 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
never 
 true 
very seldom 
true 
seldom  
true 
sometimes  
true 
frequently  
true 
almost 
always true 
always  
true 
       
1. My painful experiences and memories make it difficult for me to 
live a life that I would value. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. I’m afraid of my feelings. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. I worry about not being able to control my worries and feelings. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. My painful memories prevent me from having a fulfilling life. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. Emotions cause problems in my life. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. It seems like most people are handling their lives better than I am. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. Worries get in the way of my success. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4 
PANAS 
This scale consists of a number of words and phrases that describe different feelings and emotions. Read each item 
and then mark the appropriate answer in the space next to that word. Indicate to what extent you feel this way right 
now, that is, in the present moment. 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 very slightly a little moderately quite a bit extremely 
 or not at all 
 
 
1) interested 1   2   3   4   5 
2) distressed 1   2   3   4   5 
3) excited 1   2   3   4   5 
4) upset 1   2   3   4   5 
5) strong 1   2   3   4   5 
6) guilty 1   2   3   4   5 
7) scared 1   2   3   4   5 
8) hostile 1   2   3   4   5 
9) enthusiastic 1   2   3   4   5 
10) proud 1   2   3   4   5 
 
11) irritable 1   2   3   4   5 
12) alert 1   2   3   4   5 
13) ashamed 1   2   3   4   5 
14) inspired 1   2   3   4   5 
15) nervous 1   2   3   4   5 
16) determined 1   2   3   4   5 
17) attentive 1   2   3   4   5 
18) jittery 1   2   3   4   5 
19) active 1   2   3   4   5 
20) afraid 1   2   3   4   5 
 
 
  
5 
Appendix B 
Scripts for Induction 1 
Worry Condition Script 
During this period, we would like you to create a worrisome state. Please refer to your list 
of worrisome topics. When I ask you to begin, please close your eyes and worry about your most 
worrisome topic, in the way you usually worry about it but as intensely as you can, until I ask 
you to stop and to open your eyes. If you normally worry about only one topic at a time, please 
try to do the same during this period. However, if your thoughts change to another worry topic 
during this period feel free to allow these thoughts to continue. It is all right to change topics 
during this period if the changes occur naturally during the worry process. Please close your eyes 
and begin. Keep going until I tell you to stop; I will let you know when the time is up. (Five 
minute delay). The time is up. Please move on to the next part of the survey. 
No-Worry Control Script  
During this period, we would like you to take a few minutes to think about what you did 
this past weekend. When I ask you to begin, please close your eyes and think about what you did 
last weekend, until I ask you to stop and to open your eyes. It may help to start by thinking about 
the three things that you listed above. Please close your eyes and begin thinking. Keep going 
until I tell you to stop; I will let you know when the time is up. (Five minute delay). The time is 
up. Please move on to the next part of the survey. 
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Appendix C 
Scripts for Induction 2 
Mindfulness Script 
During this period, you will be guided through a meditation; I will let you know when the 
time is up. Please close your eyes, and listen to my voice. Begin by becoming comfortable in 
your seat, finding a place for your arms to rest, perhaps bringing both of your feet to the ground, 
taking an alert and relaxed body posture. Residing in the calm acceptance in the present without 
trying to fill it with anything. And start to notice your body, your physical sensations, as you 
switch from a mode of doing to a mode of non-doing. And take a moment to notice your 
breathing. Bring your full attention to the inbreaths, and the outbreaths. Let the breathing just 
happen, while observing it and feeling all of the sensations that are there, obvious and subtle. 
(30-second pause). Each time you notice your your mind is no longer on your breath, just see 
where it is.  Then let go and come back to your belly and to your breathing (20-second pause).  
(delay until the end of five minutes). Begin to come back to your body, scanning all the way 
down from your nose to your throat, upper chest, ribcage, belly, hips, legs, feet. Take a deep, full 
breath. You can open your eyes, and please move on to the next part of the survey. 
Thought Suppression Script 
During this period, please notice occurrences of thoughts relevant to the topics you have 
listed. It is very important that you try as hard as you can to suppress your unwanted thoughts. So 
try not to think about your unwanted thoughts, but be sure to pay attention to whether or not the 
thoughts occur. It is important that you continue in the same way for the full time.  Keep going 
until I tell you to stop; I will let you know when the time is up. (Five minute delay). The time is 
up. You can open your eyes, and please move on to the next part of the survey. 
No-Strategy Control Script 
7 
During this period, we would like you to take a few minutes to think about the last three 
movies you watched. If you’re not sure, just think about the last three that you remember clearly. 
When I ask you to begin, please close your eyes and think about these movies, until I ask you to 
stop and to open your eyes. Please close your eyes and begin thinking. Please keep going until I 
tell you to stop; I will let you know when the time is up. (Five minute delay). The time is up. You 
can open your eyes, and please move on to the next part of the survey. 
 
 
